Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

In the Matter of A Criminal Investigation 7th
District Court No. CS-1 : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen B. Nebeker; John A. Adams; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; F. Robert Reeder; Francis M.
Wikstrom; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Donald B. Holbrook; Elizabeth M. Haslam; George W. Pratt;
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Respondents.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Paul M. Warner; Robert N. Parrish; Assistant Attorneys
General; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Criminal Investigation 7th District Court No. CS-1 v., No. 920268.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4229

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMfc
K FU

45.9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
nt0k

_, -

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,

Case No. 20268

7th District Court No. CS-1
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS STOTT, COLBY AND MAXFIELD
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORIZATION IN THIS MATTER AND RULING THE
PROSECUTORS' SUBPOENA ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DONALD B. HOLBROOK,
ELIZABETH M. HASLAM, and
GEORGE W. PRATT
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents
Stott, Colby, and Maxfield
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER and
JOHN A. ADAMS,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-3850
Attorneys for Utah Power & Light Company
F. ROBERT REEDER and
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Respondent Emery Mining Corporation
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

FILED
FFRPPIQftR
rc.D6 6l300
C2crk, Sup^rno Cctfst, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,

Case No. 20268

7th District Court No. CS-1
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS STOTT, COLBY AND MAXFIELD
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORIZATION IN THIS MATTER AND RULING THE
PROSECUTORS' SUBPOENA ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DONALD B. HOLBROOK,
ELIZABETH M. HASLAM, and
GEORGE W. PRATT
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101
Attorneys for Respondents
Stott, Colby, and Maxfield
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER and
JOHN A. ADAMS,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P.O. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-3850
Attorneys for Utah Power & Light Company
F. ROBERT REEDER and
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Respondent Emery Mining Corporation
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

LIST OF PARTIES

Respondents Norman Maxfield ("Maxfield"), Karl J. Stott
("Stott"), and Orrin T. Colby, Jr. ("Colby") are represented by
the law firm, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.

They were

served with subpoenas by the Attorney General of Utah pursuant
to the above-captioned criminal investigation and moved to
quash those subpoenas in a May 30, 1984 hearing before Judge
Boyd Bunnell of the 7th Judicial Court of Emery County.
Appellant, the Utah Attorney General, represented by Robert N.
Parish, Suzanne M. Dallimore, Stanley H. Olsen, and David J.
Schwendiman, opposed the Motion to Quash, and in these
proceedings appealed the decision of Judge Bunnell issued on
September 20, 1984.

Utah Power and Light Company (the

"Company") appeared at the May 30, 1984 hearing and was
represented by the law firm, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.

Emery

Mining Company ("Emery"), represented by the law firm of
Parsons, Behle and Latimer, presented argument at a
September 12, 1984 hearing on the Motion of Stott, Maxfield and
Colby for Reconsideration of the Court's prior ruling on the
Motion to Quash.

Other parties appeared at the September 12,

1984 hearing as indicated in the list of parties contained in
the Attorney General's brief on appeal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF ALL PARTIES

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES. . . . .

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT

9

I.

THE SUBPOENA ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITS AND
ENCOURAGES THE VIOLATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PERSONAL LIBERTY
A.

B.

C.
II.

The Subpoena Act Expressly Permits the
Unreasonable Compulsion of
Evidence by Creating a Subjective
Standard of Relevance

10

The Statutory Scheme Effectively
Precludes Meaningful Judicial
Review of Subpoenas

14

The Subpoena Act Sanctions Prosecutor
Fishing Expeditions

17

THE SUBPOENA ACT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE PRIVILEGE NOT
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST ONESELF

III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF BROAD INVESTIGATORY
POWERS TO A PROSECUTOR VIOLATES DUE PROCESS . . .
A.

9

Due Process Requires That a Prosecutor's
Investigation Powers be More Carefully
Circumscribed Than Those of a Grand Jury
or Administrative Agency
-ii-

20
23

23

Pa£e
B.

IV.
V.
VI.

The Subpoena Act Unconstitutionally
Authorizes the Prosecutor to Conduct
Public Trials Without Providing Any
Safeguards to Protect Individuals
Under Investigation

31

THE SUBPOENA ACT IS VOID ON ITS FACE FOR
VAGUENESS

34

IT IS NOT A JUDICIAL FUNCTION TO REWRITE
A STATUTE BY INTERPRETATION

41

THE SUBPOENA ACT SHOULD BE DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE

44

A.

B.

C.

Unlike the Search Warrant Statute, the
Subpoena Act Requires No Prior Judicial
Approval of Subpoenas Issued Under Its
Authority

45

The Subpoena Act Contains No Effective
Deterrent Against Its Improper
Application

46

The Subpoena Act Encourages Prosecutors
to Use It Improperly

46

VII. THE SUBPOENA ACT RUNS AFOUL OF THE
SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

48

CONCLUSION

50

ADDENDUM I

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

ADDENDUM II

Subpoenas of Colby, Stott and Maxfield, and
Excerpts From Darcey White Deposition .

ADDENDUM III

ADDENDUM IV

Memorandum Decision Relative to
Constitutionality, September 20,
1984; May 30, 1984 Ruling
Legislative Debates Re:
and Former Statute

.

i

vii

xxxi

Subpoena Act
xxxviii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
A.

CASES CITED

Allen v. Trueman, 37 Utah 528, 110 P.2d 356 (1941)
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967)

...

. . . . . . .

41
9

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)

47

Calhoun County v. Galbraith, 99 U.S. 214 (1878)

43

Donovan v. Lone Steer,

U.S.

, 52 U.S.L.W.

4087, 4089 (1984)

9

Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943)

.

13

.

9, 17

Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company,
264 U.S. 298, 306 (1923)
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)

9

Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching
Company, 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504, 505 (1966)

.

37

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974)

41

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906)

6, 9

.

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 488 (1960),
reh'g denied 364 U.S. 855 (1960)

9, 25,

Hansen v. Owens, 619 P. 2d 315 (Utah 1980)

20

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) . . . .

9

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) . .

47, 48

In Re Barnett's Estate, 275 P. 453 (Cal. 1929)
In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981) .
In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 336-37, 346-7, 350-1 (1957) .

43
41
16, 25
27, 28
42

Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968)
-iv-

.

Pa

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 414, 427-29 (1969)

.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903,
909, 911 (1983),

9e

16, 28, 29,
32, 33, 34
35, 36, 37,
38, 47

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), reh'g denied,
368 U.S. 871 (1961)

9

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)

43

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966)

21, 22, 23,
43

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 107 Utah 530, 155 P.2d 184, 185
(1945) . . . . . .
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
208, 219 (1946) r T T T T T

43
11, 12, 13,
15, 18

Park v. Edgewater, Inc. v. Joy, 416 N.Y.S.2d 266,
68 A.D.2d 107 (1979)

42

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1974)

37

State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 973,
975 (1967)

20, 21, 22,
23, 40, 43

Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 218

25

United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3rd Cir. 1977) .

22

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17, 45 (1973) .
United States v. Jacobs, 574 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976)

5, 6, 25

cert, dismissed 436 U.S. 31 (1978)
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582 (1976)
U.S. v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943)
-v-

22
. .

22
42

Page
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186,
190-191 (1977)

22

United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977)

. . . . . . .

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)
B.

. .

22
34
6, 25

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES CITED

U.S. Const, amend. IV

9

U.S. Const, amend. V

20

Utah Const, art. I, § 12

20, 21

Utah Const, art. I, § 14

9

Utah Const, art VI, § 22

49

Iowa Code, § 813.2, Rule 5(6) (1979)

30

Kan. Stat. Ann., § 22-3101 (1981)

30

La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Art. 66 (West Supp. 1984)

30

Mont. Code Ann., § 46-4-304 (1983)

30

Utah Code Ann., § 77-11-3 (1982)

5, 44

Utah Code Ann., § 77-11-3(2) (1982)

31

Utah Code Ann., § 77-11-10(1) (1982)

40

Utah Code Ann., § 77-22-1 through 3 (1982)

1

Utah Code Ann., § 77-22-2(1) (1982)

5, 7, 12

Utah Code Ann. , § 77-22-2(3) (1982)

31

Utah Code Ann., § 77-22-3(3) (1982)

38

-vi-

Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-1 (1982)

5, 44, 45

Utah Code Ann., § 77-23-3(1) (1982)

5

Utah Code Ann. , § 77-35-12(g) (1982)

46

Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-14(g) (1982)

15

C.

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 28.10,
at 327 (1972)

0533h
EMH

-vii-

50

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does the Subpoena Act violate constitutionally

protected rights of personal liberty, including the right to
not give evidence against or incriminate oneself and the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures?
2.

Is the Subpoena Act unconstitutionally vague and

violative of due process because it fails to set forth
essential procedural safeguards necessary to avoid
unconstitutional and arbitrary enforcement?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Statutes and constitutional provisions determinative
of the issues on appeal are set forth in Addendum I attached
hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the Attorney General's appeal from an order of
the Seventh Judicial District Court ruling that Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-22-1 through 3 (1982) (the "Subpoena Act'1) is
unconstitutional and withdrawing judicial authorization for an
investigation conducted by the Attorney General's office under
the Subpoena Act.

The decision was entered by Judge Boyd

Bunnell on September 20, 1984 and is attached as Addendum III.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 26, 1983, Judge Boyd Bunnell authorized the
Attorney General's office to conduct a criminal investigation

pursuant to the Subpoena Act.

R. at 8.

At that time, the

court further ordered that the Subpoena Act's secrecy provision
should apply.

R. at 4.

Thereafter the Utah Attorney General

issued numerous subpoenas.

Colby, Stott and Maxfield were each

subpoenaed in April, 1984.

Copies of their subpoenas are

attached as Addendum II.
On May 14, 1984, Maxfield, Stott, and Colby moved to
quash the subpoenas duces tecum on the basis that the Subpoena
Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
62.

R. at 57,

The Attorney General responded with a Request for Order

Requiring Testimony and Production of Documents.

R. at 136.

On May 30, 1984, Judge Bunnell heard the foregoing motions and
thereafter ruled the Subpoena Act constitutional, but set forth
constitutional guidelines to be followed by prosecuting
attorneys under the Subpoena Act.

The May 30 ruling is

attached as part of Addendum III.
On July 13, 1984, Colby, Stott and Maxfield filed a
Motion to Reconsider the Court's May 30, 1984 order in part on
the 'basis of newly discovered legislative history indicating
that the Subpoena Act does not reflect true legislative intent

1

The following abbreviations are used for the
purpose of citation in this Brief: (1) "R." stands for the
record on appeal, (2) "A.G.'s Br." stands for the Utah Attorney
General's brief on appeal and (3) "Decision" means the
September 12, 1984 Memorandum Decision Relative to
Constitutionality by Judge Boyd Bunnell.

and further on the basis that judicial rewriting of a statute
to avoid a constitutional attack is not permissible.
255.

R. at

Thereafter, the Attorney General withdrew all outstanding

subpoenas issued under the investigation except one to the
custodian of records of Emery.

On August 21, 1984, Emery moved

to quash this only outstanding subpoena.

R. at 633.

On September 12, 1984, Judge Bunnell considered the
Motion to Reconsider of Colby, Stott and Maxfield, the
Company's motion for a protective order, and Emery's motion to
quash.

At that time, Judge Bunnell quashed the outstanding

subpoena to Emery and took under advisement the issues as to
the constitutionality of the Subpoena Act.
On September 20, 1984, Judge Bunnell issued his
Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality holding the
Subpoena Act unconstitutional.

The criminal investigation

authorized by the Subpoena Act was accordingly dismissed.

R.

at 734.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To fully appreciate the constitutional issues raised
on this appeal, it will be helpful to keep in mind that the
Subpoena Act confers on the prosecutorial arm of government
criminal investigative powers far beyond those existing in the
federal system and under state laws generally.

The statute

grants to the State's prosecutors virtually unlimited

discretion to carry out criminal investigations unfettered by
judicial restraint, but under the guise of court authority.
The Subpoena Act provides that the prosecuting attorneys of
Utah, upon the approval of the district court, may conduct a
criminal investigation.

Once having received the court's

general approval of the investigation, prosecuting attorneys
may issue subpoenas to obtain evidence and documents deemed
relevant to the prosecutor.

The prosecuting attorneys may also

have the district court order, as in the case at bar, that the
proceedings be secret.

The statute does not require that

self-incrimination or any other warnings be given to witnesses
or targets of the investigation except their entitlement to be
represented by counsel.

Further, prosecuting attorneys are not

required to obtain court approval prior to issuance of
subpoenas or to file a return of service of subpoenas so that
the court's file contains a complete record of subpoenas issued.
Prior to the enactment of the Subpoena Act in 1980,
Utah law enforcement officials (prosecutors and police) had the
following carefully limited investigative tools:
1.

A subpoena to testify or produce documents could

be obtained under the 1971 version of the Subpoena Act, but
only upon a court approved showing of "good cause" for the
issuance of each subpoena.

In 1980 this important safeguard

was eliminated, without discussion, during a busy budget

session.

See excerpts from 1971 and 1980 legislative history,

attached as Addendum IV.
2.

A search warrant could be obtained, but only upon

a showing of probable cause to an impartial magistrate, and
under defined limitations.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3(1) (1982).

The Subpoena Act sweeps away the previously existing
"probable caused requirements to obtain evidence, and grants
the prosecution heretofore unseen powers of criminal
investigation.

In express violation of the Fourth Amendment

requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable, the
prosecutor may now unilaterally subpoena witnesses and
documents upon his subjective determination that evidence
sought is relevant to the authorized investigation.

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982).
Ironically, the Subpoena Act confers greater
investigative powers upon a prosecutor than those hitherto
reserved to the Utah grand jury.

Under Utah law a grand jury

must warn a witness that he is a target of the investigation
and advise him of his rights against self-incrimination.
Further, a grand jury may receive only "legal evidence."
Code Ann.

§ 77-11-3 (1982).

Utah

The irony, of course, is that

even greater powers of investigation are now in the hands of
the prosecutor—the entity against which grand juries serve as
a buffer to protect the suspected and accused.

The breadth of the investigative powers enjoyed by a
grand jury has always been premised on the existence of vital
assumptions about the grand jury process.

See U.S. v.

Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 45 (1973), Marshall J., dissenting.

The

grand jury finds its roots in the beginnings of the common
law.

Historically and in practice, the grand jury has served

as "an investigative body 'acting independently of either
prosecuting attorney or judge,' (citation omitted) whose
mission is to clear the innocent no less than to bring to trial
those who may be guilty. . . . "
U.S. at 16-17.

U.S. v. Dionisio, supra, 410

The grand jury serves "as a protective bulwark

standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an
over zealous prosecutor . . . ."

Id..

(emphasis added).

See

also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 59 (1906).

The vesting of traditional grand jury

powers in the prosecutor encourages and has resulted in the
abuse of the investigative process.
Although Judge Bunnell had only a handful of the
subpoenas that have been issued in this criminal investigation
before him, he concluded that:
The Act has been abused and is subject to
continued abuse under its broad terms and
provisions that set no limitations upon the
State or any guidelines to the use of their
subpoena p o w e r . . . .

This Court has, therefore concluded that the
Act is too vague and does not give proper
protection to individual citizens against the
violation of their constitutional right of due
process and protection against self
incrimination and allows for an absolute abuse
of power without the benefit of judicial
review or control once the general subpoena
power is granted and finds the Act is
unconstitutional.
Decision at 4.
Judge Bunnell's conclusion is premised in part on his
determination that the Attorney General has used the unfettered
discretion granted him under the Subpoena Act to subpoena
documents that are plainly irrelevant to the investigation and
upon his determination that subpoenas served are overbroad in
light of the authorized scope of the investigation.
The Subpoena Actfs sanction of "an absolute abuse of
power," in Judge Bunnell's words, is the natural consequence of
certain critical deficiencies in the statute.

The exorbitant

breadth and scope of information sought is attributable to the
absolute discretion granted the prosecutor.

Information sought

pursuant to the Subpoena Act need only be "relevant to the
investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county
attorney."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982).

The Attorney

General is thus vested by the Subpoena Act with complete
discretion to determine what is relevant.
In addition to granting a prosecutor virtually
complete discretion to delve into the personal lives of Utah

citizens, the Subpoena Act fails to provide witnesses with
vital protections that even a witness subpoenaed by a Utah
grand jury would have—the right to be advised if he is a
target of an investigation and of his privilege against
self-incrimination.

Further, the judicial oversight present in

the grand jury system is absent under the Subpoena Act.
Because the Subpoena Act permits an investigation to
be conducted in complete secrecy, an individual served with a
subpoena has no means whatsoever to intelligently determine
whether the information sought is relevant to the matters under
investigation by the prosecutor and therefore lawful in light
of Fourth Amendment constraints.

Alternatively, if a

prosecutor chooses to not invoke the secrecy allowed under the
Act, a prosecutor may conduct a public investigation with the
result that innocent suspects may be subject to public
incrimination by virtue of their association with a criminal
investigation.
For reasons set out in more detail below, the
deficiencies in the Subpoena Act render it unconstitutional in
several respects.

It authorizes unreasonable searches and

seizures, fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination, and otherwise denies
procedural safeguards inherent in due process.

The failure of

the Subpoena Act to establish minimal constitutional safeguards
further renders the Subpoena Act void for vagueness.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUBPOENA ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITS AND ENCOURAGES
THE VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PERSONAL
LIBERTY.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide the
people of Utah with fundamental protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The security of one's

privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion is at the core
of the Fourth Amendment and basic to a free society.

See,

e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).

Gouled

v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
Fourth Amendment rights are respected as foundational
of our political and social system.

The United States Supreme

Court has "consistently asserted that the rights of privacy and
personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . are
to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional
liberty . . . ."
(1947).

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150

The Fourth Amendment protections apply whether the

invasion is made through a subpoena duces tecum or a search
warrant.

Donovan v. Lone Steer,

U.S.

, 52 U.S. L.W.

4087, 4089 (1984); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, (1960),
rehearing den. 364 U.S. 855; Federal Trade Commission v.
American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S. 298 (1923); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).

The Attorney General defends the Subpoena Act's Fourth
Amendment deficiencies essentially on the basis that every
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights are adequately protected by
the implicit right to obtain pre-compliance judicial review of
a subpoena duces tecum by moving to quash on Fourth Amendment
grounds.

Contrary to this view, the Subpoena Act expressly

allows the prosecuting attorneys of Utah to serve and demand
compliance with constitutionally defective subpoenas.
Furthermore the secrecy and penal nature of the statutory
framework created by the Subpoena Act and related rules
discourages the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights and
consequently encourages abuse of prosecutorial subpoena power.
A.

The Subpoena Act Expressly Permits the Unreasonable
Compulsion of Evidence by Creating a Subjective
Standard of Relevance.
Counsel for respondents Stott, Colby and Maxfield have

extensively researched both state and federal law relating to
the subpoena power of a prosecuting attorney and have
discovered no authority validating a statute granting the
prosecutorial agency of government the breadth of discretion to
compel testimony and documents pursuant to a secret or public
inquisitorial process, as sanctioned by the Subpoena Act.
Respondents do not disagree with the concept that
extensive legal powers are enjoyed by a grand jury or

-10-

administrative agency to issue subpoenas.

However/ Respondents

take issue with the analysis that such power compels the
conclusion that the Subpoena Act sustains a Fourth Amendment
attack where such powers are given to a prosecutor who under
the Subpoena Act also holds the power to (1) investigate in
secret or public proceedings/ (2) bring charges based on such
investigation and (3) prosecute charges resulting therefrom
with adversarial zeal.
The Attorney General relies extensively on Oklahoma
Press Pub. Co.

v. Walling/ 327 U.S. 186 (1946) for the

proposition that a federal agency may constitutionally issue
subpoenas, without prior judicial approval/ so long as: (1)
each subpoena is issued pursuant to an investigation having a
lawfully authorized purpose, (2) the documents or evidence
sought are relevant to the inquiry/ and (3) the documents to be
produced are not unduly broad or burdensome and are adequately
described.

The Court in Walling/ supra# observes that if a

citizen believes a subpoena violates his Fourth Amendment
rights/ he may obtain access to the courts to quash the
subpoena.

Assuming, arguendo/ that Walling is determinative of

the constitutional issues here, the Subpoena Act cannot
2
withstand the standards set forth therein.

2

The facts before the Court in Walling are
importantly distinguishable from the facts at issue here.

The essential "relevancy" standard found in Walling is
absent from the Subpoena Act.

Walling necessarily requires an

objective determination of relevance, such determination being
a principal part of the equation for testing the
"reasonableness" of the seizure of documents under the Fourth
Amendment.

327 U.S. at 208.

Walling does not stand for the

proposition that "relevance" may be determined by the issuing
party.

Otherwise/ the availability of judicial review to

determine the reasonableness of a subpoena would be meaningless.
The Subpoena Act, in contravention of the
constitutional requirement that subpoenas be "relevant",
provides that the prosecuting attorney may subpoena evidence
which he deems relevant.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982).

^ (Continued) First, the issues in the case did not
involve an attack on the validity of a statute authorizing
subpoena power. Rather, the question was whether an agency
could conduct a fishing expedition into books and records in
order to secure evidence that petitioners had violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (1938). The obvious
distinction between an administrator issuing subpoenas under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Attorney General
subpoenaing records are that: (1) a person served with a
subpoena by the federal agency knows the nature of the inquiry
by virtue of the agency serving the subpoena, i.e., the
subpoena relates to matters authorized for investigation under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (not any one of a multitude of
crimes found throughout the criminal statutes in Utah); (2)
the Fair Labor Standards Act, unlike the Subpoena Act, does not
endow an agency with rights and powers of secrecy which prevent
a party from being served with a subpoena from having any
knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the investigation
or the target of the investigation.

A literal interpretation of the Subpoena Act requires a judge
reviewing the lawfulness of the subpoena under the Subpoena Act
to uphold its validity so long as a prosecutor can make a good
faith showing that in his or her judgment the subpoena requires
evidence relevant to the investigation.

This would be true

notwithstanding the fact that a judge, exercising his own
independent review, is not in agreement with the reasonableness
of the request.

The subjective test of relevance in the

Subpoena Act stands in express violation of the Fourth
Amendment requirement that subpoenas be objectively reasonable.
It is no surprise that, as described more fully below,
several subpoenas issued by the Attorney General under the
Subpoena Act have been abusive.

The Attorney General admits in

his brief that he has interpreted and applied the Subpoena Act
in a manner totally at odds with the constitutional
requirements set out in Walling.

In the Attorney Generalfs

view, the evidence sought is "relevant" as long as it "is not
plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the
agency . . . ."

A.G.'s Br. at 23-24.

In support of this

extraordinarily broad interpretation of the constitutional
concept of relevance, the Attorney General cites Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) where the Fourth
Amendment rights were not at issue.

The Attorney General,

then, according to his interpretation, may subpoena documents

which in his mind are not plainly irrelevant.

Such broad power

to compel evidence cannot withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
B.

The Statutory Scheme Effectively Precludes Meaningful
Judicial Review of Subpoenas.
In defense of his position that pre-compliance

judicial review cures any constitutional defect in the exercise
of subpoena power, the Attorney General states that any attempt
to circumvent an unconstitutional subpoena
by the court upon motion.

,,

willn be thwarted

A.G.'s Br. at 17.

In the same

thought the Attorney General observes that any failure to so
object will constitute a waiver of protected rights.

JA.

With

these affirmative statements in mind, it is interesting to note
that the Attorney General has been pursuing a criminal
investigation since January, 1983.

R. at 4.

Presumably during

that period the Attorney General has issued numerous subpoenas
which have been responded to.

It was not until May, 1984, that

any party objected or moved to quash a subpoena.

That

objection was made by Respondents Colby, Stott and Maxfield on
May 25, 1984.
It is not surprising that there have been few
objections to subpoenas.

First, the subpoenas in the Record

nowhere advise a witness of his asserted right to quash.
Moreover, the subpoenas in the record (and presumably all
subpoenas issued in the criminal investigation) explicitly

provide that "[t]his subpoena duces tecum is authorized by
order of the District Court«

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court."

See Addendum II.

While the

Attorney General's threat of contempt of court may be
misleading in that it may be misinterpreted to mean a court has
specifically reviewed and ordered the subpoena, the threat has
force and meaning under the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure.
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "failure to obey a
subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of
court by the court responsible for its issuance".
Ann. § 77-35-14(g) (1982).

Utah Code

The threat of being penalized for

failure to comply, together with the respect for and fear of
the authority of the prosecutor serving a subpoena necessarily
acts as a real and practical deterrent to the free exercise of
Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Murphy, dissenting in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 217 (1946), aptly characterized the impact
of agency subpoenas:
To allow a non-judicial officer,
unarmed with judicial process, to demand the
books and papers of an individual is an open
invitation to abuse of that power. It is no
answer that the individual may refuse to
produce the material demanded. Many persons
have yielded solely because of the air of
authority with which the demand is made, a
demand that cannot be enforced without
subsequent judicial aid. Many invasions of
private rights thus occur without the

restraining hand of the judiciary ever
intervening. . . . Liberty is too priceless
to be forfeited through the zeal of an
administrative agent.
327 U.S. at 219.
The potential for abuse under the Subpoena Act is even
greater than that observed by Justice Murphy where the subpoena
power rests in the hands of a zealous prosecutor.

See, e.g.,

In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 336 (1957); Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411 (1969) discussed infra.
The secrecy provisions of the Subpoena Act further
discourage the assertion of fundamental rights.

According to

the Attorney General, the Subpoena Act allows a prosecutor to
decline disclosure of the nature of - the pending investigation
or whether a witness is a target of the investigation.
Addendum II, excerpts from Darcey White deposition.

See

Without

such knowledge it is impossible for a party compelled to submit
documentary evidence to assess the relevancy and therefore the
constitutionality of a subpoena.

Under the framework of the

Subpoena Act, each subpoena must be questioned for
constitutionality inasmuch as the validity thereof is
impossible to test absent a request for judicial review
regarding relevancy.

The fact that Respondents Colby, Stott

and Maxfield were the first to request their constitutional
right to judicial review indicates that the secrecy provisions

of the Subpoena Act/ together with the fear of contempt
penalties and the intimidating authority of prosecuting
attorneys has effectively discouraged and deterred the exercise
of the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the other participants in the criminal
investigation.
C.

The Subpoena Act Sanctions Prosecutor Fishing
Expeditions.
It is fundamental that a government investigation

cannot be used to engage in a fishing expedition.

Long ago, in

Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S.
298 (1923), Justice Holmes said:
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as
the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be
loath to believe that Congress intended to
authorize one of its subordinate agencies to
sweep all our traditions into the fire
(citations omitted) and to direct fishing
expeditions into private papers on the
possibility that they may disclose evidence
of a crime.
Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
Due to the secrecy employed by the Attorney General,
it cannot be stated unequivocally that the Attorney General is
conducting an unconstitutional fishing expedition.

However,

the circumstantial facts indicate that this is so.

Perhaps the

most telling indication is the Attorney General's actions in
the proceedings below.

Shortly after Colby, Stott and Maxfield

moved below for reconsideration of Judge Bunnell's May 30, 1984
ruling, the Attorney General withdrew all outstanding
subpoenas, save one directed to Emery.

Significantly this

subpoena, the only one not withdrawn, was quashed by Judge
Bunnell as "too broad in any investigation of any criminal
activity".

Decision at 2.

Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra, which the
Attorney General argues sets the controlling standard in this
case, requires that to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a subpoena
duces tecum may not be overly broad or burdensome and it may
request only "relevant" evidence.
Although only a handful of them are in the record,
several of the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this criminal
investigation fail to meet the Walling standard.

Respondents

Stott and Colby were each "commanded to bring . . . any and all
books, records, documents, accounts, or papers pertaining to
Utah Power & Light including, but not limited to:

information

and documentation regarding all uranium properties purchased,
controlled and managed by Utah Power & Light . . . ."

See

Addendum II. The request is not limited by time, by specific
document, the type of document, or the individual preparing the
document.

Literally, the subpoenas require production of all

books and records pertaining to Utah Power and Light Company.

Judge Bunnell found that the subpoenas requested
irrelevant documents, because they "attempted to get into Utah
Power and Light Company's dealings in uranium mining, when in
fact the original Good Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication
of any criminal dealings in this area."

Decision at 2.

The subpoena duces tecum served on Emery Mining
Company commanded it to produce:
Records which identify all officers,
directors, consultants, and employees (both
union and non-union, professional and
mining) of Emery Mining for the period 1979
to the present. Such shall include, but not
be limited to, names, addresses, telephone
numbers, dates of employment and employee
numbers, if known.
Decision at 2.
This request is similarly not limited by subject
matter, the specific document or type of document, but requires
the production of documents over an indefinite period of time
and may require production of numerous documents irrelevant to
the government's investigation.

Accordingly, Judge Bunnell

ordered it "suppressed as being too broad in any investigation
of any criminal activity."

Id.

The overbreadth, lack of

specificity, and unlimited time periods covered by the
subpoenas duces tecum illustrate the "fishing expedition"
nature of the investigation and reveal the abusive exploitation
of the Act by the Attorney General.

II.

THE SUBPOENA ACT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE PRIVILEGE NOT
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST ONESELF.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides all citizens with the privilege against
self-incrimination.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah

Constitution provides the more expansive right that a person
may not be compelled to give evidence against himself.

Hansen

v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980).
The secrecy provisions of the Subpoena Act (according
to the Attorney General) empower prosecuting attorneys to
refuse to inform a witness who is the target of a criminal
investigation that he is the target and to refuse to disclose
to him the nature of the investigation, with the effect that a
suspected participant in a crime is denied the right to make an
intelligent decision to invoke his privilege of not giving
evidence against himself.

A.G.'s Br. at 28-34.

In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969
(1967), this court held that a person under investigation by a
grand jury must be informed that he is the target of the
investigation, the nature of the charges against him, and in
connection therewith, he must be informed of his constitutional
right not to be a witness against himself.

429 P.2d at 973.

In so doing the court recognized that inherent in

constitutional privileges is the right to exercise them
intelligently.

429 P.2d at at 975.

In Ruggeri, a county commissioner was called before
the grand jury.

Unbeknownst to him, he was the target of the

grand jury investigation which subsequently indicted him and
others.

He was also subsequently indicted for perjury in

connection with the testimony obtained by the district attorney
before the grand jury.

The district court suppressed the

evidence given by the county commissioner, and this court
upheld the ruling, basing its opinion on Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution and the United States Supreme Court
decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

The court

acknowledged the rule that an ordinary witness before a grand
jury must give testimony except where it might incriminate him,
but that
[0]ne being investigated for crime is not
just a witness and cannot be treated as
such. The target of an investigation is an
accused within the meaning of the
Constitution, and when he is detained in any
significant way, he may not be interrogated
unless he is advised of the charges against
him then under consideration. To> fail to so
warn one so being investigated is to entrap
him and to violate his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 973.

(emphasis added).

Implicit in Ruggeri is the notion that it is an
integral part of each citizen's constitutional right against

self-incrimination that one have the knowledge necessary to
make an informed decision to exercise or waive such right:
It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury
investigation could not intelligently
determine whether or not he needed counsel
unless he was fully advised of the charges
being considered against him; and until he
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he
will not know when to assert his
constitutional claim of privilege against
self incrimination. It would also be
difficult to believe that he could
intelligently waive the right to counsel
under such circumstances,
429 P.2d at 975.
The Attorney General argues that Ruggeri is not
necessarily good law, noting that there is apparently no
Miranda warning requirement in federal grand jury proceedings.
In fact the United States Supreme Court has specifically
declined to rule whether a grand jury witness must be warned of
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.

United States v.

Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186, 190-191 (1977); United States v.
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564, 582 (1976).
question.

The Circuit Courts are split on the

United States v. Jacobs, 574 F.2d 772 (2d Cir.

1976), cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (warning is
required); United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3rd Cir.
1977) (no warning required).

This body of federal law cited by

the Attorney General is certainly no authority for a holding

that the Ruggeri rule is wrong.
merit of the Ruggeri decision,

If anything, it upholds the
A state court cannot interpret

a statute to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to
exercise the privilege against self incrimination, but a state
court has authority to more liberally construe those rights to
protect against governmental incursions into personal liberty.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
As discussed infra, the rule laid down in Ruggeri,
regarding the rights of a witness before a grand jury
proceeding, necessarily applies with greater force in an
investigatory proceeding under the Subpoena Act where the
protective shield of the grand jury does not stand as a buffer
between the accuser and the accused.
III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF BROAD INVESTIGATORY POWERS TO A
PROSECUTOR VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
A#

Due Process Requires that a Prosecutor's Investigation
Powers be More Carefully Circumscribed Than Those of A
Grand Jury or Administrative Agency.
Without analysis, the Attorney General equates the

legitimacy of investigative powers conferred by the Subpoena
Act with the powers of investigation granted to grand juries,
A.G.'s Br., at 23-4, and the investigatory powers conferred on
various administrative agencies.

A.G.'s Br. at 19.

the Attorney General's position is that it makes no

In effect,

self-incrimination that one have the knowledge necessary to
make an informed decision to exercise or waive such right:
It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury
investigation could not intelligently
determine whether or not he needed counsel
unless he was fully advised of the charges
being considered against him; and until he
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he
will not know when to assert his
constitutional claim of privilege against
self incrimination. It would also be
difficult to believe that he could
intelligently waive the right to counsel
under such circumstances.
429 P.2d at 975.
The Attorney General argues that Ruggeri is not
necessarily good law, noting that there is apparently no
Miranda warning requirement in federal grand jury proceedings.
In fact the United States Supreme Court has specifically
declined to rule whether a grand jury witness must be warned of
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.

United States v.

Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186, 190-191 (1977); United States v.
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564, 582 (1976).
question.

The Circuit Courts are split on the

United States v. Jacobs, 574 F.2d 772 (2d Cir.

1976), cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (warning is
required); United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3rd Cir.
1977) (no warning required).

This body of federal law cited by

the Attorney General is certainly no authority for a holding

that the Ruggeri rule is wrong.
merit of the Ruggeri decision.

If anything, it upholds the
A state court cannot interpret

a statute to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to
exercise the privilege against self incrimination, but a state
court has authority to more liberally construe those rights to
protect against governmental incursions into personal liberty.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
As discussed infra, the rule laid down in Ruggeri,
regarding the rights of a witness before a grand jury
proceeding, necessarily applies with greater force in an
investigatory proceeding under the Subpoena Act where the
protective shield of the grand jury does not stand as a buffer
between the accuser and the accused.
III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF BROAD INVESTIGATORY POWERS TO A
PROSECUTOR VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
A.

Due Process Requires that a Prosecutor's Investigation
Powers be More Carefully Circumscribed Than Those of A
Grand Jury or Administrative Agency.
Without analysis, the Attorney General equates the

legitimacy of investigative powers conferred by the Subpoena
Act with the powers of investigation granted to grand juries,
A.G.'s Br., at 23-4, and the investigatory powers conferred on
various administrative agencies.

A.G.'s Br. at 19.

the Attorney General's position is that it makes no

In effect,

constitutional difference whatsoever who has been empowered to
conduct a criminal investigation.
The Attorney General overlooks perhaps the most
offensive feature of the Subpoena Act—it grants the broad
powers of investigation traditionally vested solely in a grand
jury to the prosecutor, the public official whose sworn duty is
to obtain convictions and put people in jail.

The Attorney

General ignores critical differences between the prosecutor, on
the one hand, and the grand jury or administrative agency on
the other.

As demonstrated below, the broad powers of

investigation granted to grand juries and administrative
agencies is premised on vital assumptions about the roles
played by those entities, assumptions which do not pertain when
broad investigatory powers are conferred on a prosecutor.

It

is important to keep in mind that whether a particular grant of
investigative authority is consistent with due process always
depends on the specific facts and circumstances at issue:
Due process is an elusive concept . . . .
[It] embodies the differing rules of fair
play, which through the years, have become
associated with different types of
proceedings. Whether the Constitution
requires that a particular right obtain in a
specific proceeding depends upon a
complexity of factors. The nature of the
alleged right involved, the nature of the
proceeding, and the possible burden on that
proceeding, are all considerations which
must be taken into account.

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).

Accord In Re

Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957).
1.
The Broad Powers of Investigation Conferred on
the Grand Jury are Predicated on its Historical Role as a
Buffer Between the Accused and the Prosecutor.
The grand jury system is of ancient common law origin
and serves the purpose of providing protection against
vindictive and malicious government prosecutions.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).

Wood v.

Historically and in practice,

the grand jury has served as "an investigative body 'acting
independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge,

Stirone

v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 218, whose mission is to clear the
innocent no less than to bring to trial those who may be
guilty."

U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).

The

grand jury serves "as a protective bulwark standing solidly
between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor
. ..."

Id., at 17.

The role of the grand jury was expressed

cogently by Justice Black:
The traditional English and American grand
jury is composed of 12 to 23 members
selected from the general citizenry of the
locality where the alleged crime was
committed. They bring into the grand jury
room the experience, knowledge and viewpoint
of all sections of the community. They have
no axes to grind and are not charged
personally with the administration of the
law. No one of them is a prosecuting
attorney or law-enforcement officer
ferreting out crime. It would be very
difficult for officers of the state

seriously to abuse or deceive a witness in
the presence of the grand jury.
In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346-7 (1957), Black, J.,
dissenting.

(Emphasis added).

Although this language appears

in a dissenting opinion, it unquestionably articulates the
function of the grand jury in the administration of criminal
justice.
Implicit in the grand jury system is the notion that a
prosecuting attorney may not act with the proper motives and
objectivity during investigatory proceedings.
is obviously different than a grand jury.

The prosecutor

He is the officer

the grand jury is designed to protect the citizenry from.

In

light of the adversarial role the prosecutor plays in the
criminal justice system, due process requires greater
procedural protections when broad powers of investigation
exercised by a prosecutor.
2.
Administrative Agencies Enjoy Broad Powers of
Investigation Because, Unlike a Prosecutor, They Do Not
Perform an Accusatory Function.
Like the grand jury, administrative agencies enjoy
broad powers of investigation due to the particular role they
play in the governmental process.

The United States Supreme

Court has held that the requirements of due process are greater
when investigatory powers are conferred on a prosecutor, as
opposed to an administrative agency.

In In Re Groban, 352 U.S.

330 (1957)/ for example, the Court considered an Ohio statute
authorizing a fire commissioner to subpoena and interrogate
witnesses secretly to determine the cause of a fire.

The Court

upheld the statute against a claim that its failure to permit
interrogated individuals to be represented by counsel violated
due process.
Six of the Justices in Grobaxi, however, articulated
the crucial difference between granting investigatory powers to
a purely fact-finding body as opposed to a prosecutor.

Justice

Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Harlan,
agreed with the result of the majority opinion on the basis
that the investigation performed by the fire commission served
a purely fact-finding function.
bar from the

He distinguished the facts at

prosecutorial power to conduct a secret

investigation:
What has been said disposes of the
suggestion that, because this statute
relating to a general administrative,
non-prosecutorial inquiry into caiuses of
fire is sustained, it would follow that
secret inquisitorial powers given to a
District Attorney would also have to be
sustained. The Due Process Clause does not
disregard vital differences.
Id. at 337.
The four dissenting Justices were even more adamant.
Justice Black recoiled at the possible implications of the
majority's holding:

[T]he opinion could readily be applied to
sanction a grant of similar power to every
state trooper, policeman, sheriff, marshal,
constable, FBI agent, prosecuting attorney,
immigration official, narcotics agent,
health officer, sanitation inspector,
building inspector, tax collector, customs
officer and to all the other countless state
and federal officials who have authority to
investigate violations of the law. I
believe that the majority opinion offers a
completely novel and extremely dangerous
precedent—one that could be used to destroy
a society of liberty under law and to
establish in its place authoritarian
government.
Id. at 350-1 (emphasis added).
If they do not condemn a secret investigation
conducted by a prosecutor as per se unconstitutional, the six
concurring and dissenting Justices in Groban at the very least
recognize a vast difference between vesting investigatory
powers in law enforcement officials, as opposed to those who
perform a fact-finding function.

The Constitution requires

greater procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights
when citizens are investigated by a prosecutor.
The United States Supreme Court again expressed the
critical constitutional difference between granting powers of
investigation to a fact-finding body and a prosecutor in
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).

In Jenkins, the

Court held that individuals interrogated by a commission
created under Louisiana law to investigate criminal violations

in the field of labor-management relations were entitled to
basic due process protections because of the accusatory
function performed by the commission-

The Court distinguished

the case from Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (I960), where the
investigative body at issue performed a purely
information-gathering function, and cited the following
language from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Hannah s
"Were the [Civil Rights] Commission
exercising an accusatory function, were its
duty to find that named individuals were
responsible for wrongful deprivation of
voting rights and to advertise such finding
or to serve as part of the process of
criminal prosecution, the rigorous
protections relevant to criminal
prosecutions might well be the controlling
starting point for assessing the protection
which the Commission's procedure provides."
Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 428 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 488 (I960)).

In short, the Court found that because the

Louisiana commission in Jenkins performed the functions of a
prosecutor, and was not a mere fact-finder, that due process
required the imposition of greater procedural safeguards.
3.
The Constitution Requires More Stringent
Procedural Safeguards to Control Investigative Power
Granted to a Prosecutor.
The foregoing authorities compel the conclusion that a
prosecutor conducting an investigation is different in kind

than a grand jury or administrative agency doing the same
thing.

A prosecutor obviously cannot act as a buffer between

himself and the public, like a grand jury; nor does he serve a
simple fact-finding function.

Instead, by definition, a

prosecutor is an adversary of the accused with the sworn duty
to act zealously in the public interest to obtain convictions.
Due to this vital law enforcement role of the prosecutor,
greater procedural safeguards are constitutionally mandated to
keep his power in check.
Respondents would not go so far as to say that any
grant of investigative power to the prosecutor violates due
process, however.

Respondents submit that the Subpoena Act

would be rendered constitutional if it simply provided for
prior judicial approval of each subpoena sought to be served by
the prosecutor.

This vital protection has been incorporated

into the statutes of other states that grant subpoena power to
the prosecutor.

See Iowa Code, § 813.2, Rule 5(6) (1979); Kan.

Stat. Ann., § 22-3101 (1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Art. 66
(West Supp. 1984); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-4-304 (1983).
Significantly, the 1971 version of the Subpoena Act provided
for prior judicial approval of subpoenas, but this important
safeguard was removed in 1980 without discussion, during a busy
budget session.

See Addendum IV (legislative history of 1971

predecessor to Subpoena Act and 1980 revision).
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In addition, the Subpoena Act should at least
incorporate the safeguards that now exist under Utah law to
protect the rights of grand jury witnesses, the right to be
advised whether one is a target, and the right to be advised of
one's privilege against self-incrimination.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-11-3(2) (1982).
B.

The Subpoena Act Unconstitutionally Authorizes the
Prosecutor to Conduct Public Trials Without Providing
Any Safeguards to Protect Individuals Under
Investigation"
Although the criminal investigation before this court

has been conducted in secret, secrecy is not required by the
Subpoena Act*

The decision to conduct a secret investigation

is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor.

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-22-2(3) (1982) provides in relevant part that:
The Attorney General or any county
attorney may make written application to any
district court and the court may order that
interrogation of any witness shall be held
in secret; that such proceeding be secret;
and that the record of testimony be kept
secret unless and until the court for good
cause otherwise orders. (emphasis added).
Thus, the Subpoena Act expressly authorizes prosecutors to
conduct their investigations publicly.
It takes little imagination to envision the phenomenal
abuse resulting if the prosecutor, in his discretion, were to
make his investigations public.

Anyone who, in the

prosecutor's judgment, might "know something relevant to the
subject of an authorized inquiry could be questioned at length
concerning that matter.

Unlike grand jury investigations

which, for anciently recognized reasons, are conducted in
secrecy, the Subpoena Act would authorize the prosecutor to
conduct the same type of investigation in public.

The press

could, and no doubt would, be invited, and reputations could be
destroyed.
In practice it would permit the prosecutor to conduct
public trials without probable cause to believe a crime has
been committed.

Instead, the prosecutor's "judgment" would be

sufficient to interrogate a witness in public.

The Subpoena

Act permits this type of interrogation and at the same time
denies a witness any right to defend himself or present
evidence in his behalf, thus failing to provide due process
guarantees recognized by the Supreme Court in Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
^ n Jenkins/ as discussed supra, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutional implications of a special
commission created under Louisiana law whose purpose was "the
investigation and findings of facts relating to violations or
possible violations of criminal laws of the state of Louisiana
or of the United States arising out of or in connection with
matters in the field of labor-management relations."
414.

j[d. at

Under the Louisiana Act, the Commission's investigations

could be held in public.

The Commission itself had no

authority to make an adjudication of criminality, but was
authorized to make findings and recommendations to the Attorney
General.
Despite the fact that the Commission exercised an
exclusively investigatory function, the Court nonetheless found
that a witness interrogated by the Commission was entitled to
basic due process rights:
It is true . . . that the Commission does
not adjudicate in the sense that a court
does, nor does the Commission conduct,
strictly speaking, a criminal proceeding.
Nevertheless, the Act, when analyzed in
light of the allegations of the complaint,
makes it clear that the Commission exercises
a function very much akin to making an
official adjudication of criminal
culpability. ~ I
[It] is empowered to be
used and allegedly is used to find name?
individuals guilty of violating the criminal
laws of Louisiana and the United States and
to brand them as criminals in public.
Id. at 427-8 (emphasis added).
The Court held that because, by conducting public
investigations, "the Commission exercises a function very much
akin to making an official adjudication of criminal
culpability, • . . " (even though it had no authority to
convict), that due process requires that an individual under
investigation by the Louisiana Commission was entitled to
cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his own
behalf.

Id. at 428-9.

The Subpoena Act could potentially be applied in
precisely the same manner as the statute at issue in Jenkins.
The prosecutor, to expose violations of the criminal laws, is
empowered to subpoena and interrogate witnesses in public.
Even though no determination of criminality may be made
pursuant to the investigation, under Jenkins a witness
interrogated in public is entitled to present his own evidence
and cross-examine witnesses against him.

The Subpoena Act's

failure to provide these protections alone renders it
unconstitutional.
Furthermore, because the Subpoena Act provides no
protection whatsoever to permit an individual interrogated in
such a manner to clear his name, the individual's reputation, a
protected "liberty" interest, may effectively be ruined by a
prosecutor with an axe to grind, without due process of law.
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
Although no prosecutor has yet used the Subpoena Act in this
manner, if it is upheld there is no guarantee this would not
happen in the future.
IV.

THE SUBPOENA ACT IS VOID ON ITS FACE FOR VAGUENESS.
Judge Bunnell below held the Subpoena Act

unconstitutional for a number of reasons, but in part because
he "concluded that the Subpoena Act is too vague . . . ."

Decision at 4.

The Attorney General dismisses the vagueness

concept summarily:

"Vagueness is an inappropriate way to

characterize any perceived problem with the statute.11
Br. at 40.

A.G.'s

The Attorney General then discusses at length what,

in his view, Judge Bunnell really meant when he referred to the
statute's vagueness.
Respondents submit that Judge Bunnell knew exactly
what he was talking about when he found the statute too vague.
He agreed with respondents' contention asserted below that a
statute is unconstitutionally vague when it fails to "establish
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement."

Kolender v.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983).
Kolender involved a challenge to the facial validity
of a California criminal statute requiring a person stopped by
the police to provide "credible and reliable" identification.
Under the statute, a person failing to provide the police with
"credible and reliable" identification could be arrested.

The

petitioner in Kolender asserted that the statute, by failing to
more specifically define what identification would be "credible
and reliable", granted an impermissible degree of discretion to
law enforcement officials, and was therefore unconstitutionally
vague under the due process clause.
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor, agreed.

The Court noted that "[a]s generally

stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.11

75 L. Ed. 2d at 909.

This is

apparently the only strand of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
the Attorney General considered in his contention that
" [v]agueness is an inappropriate way to characterize any
perceived problem with the statute."
As the Supreme Court notes in Kolender, however, the
doctrine has broader implications:
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual
notice to citizens and arbitrary
enforcement, we have recognized recently
that the more important aspect of vagueness
[sic] doctrine "is not actual notice, but
the other principal element of the doctrine
- the requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 414
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). Where the
legislature fails to provide such minimum
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections." (quoting Smith,
supra, at 475).
Id.

(emphasis added).
Applying the foregoing principles to the statute

before it, the Court found that it:
contains no standard for determining what a
suspect has to do in order to satisfy the

requirement to prove a "credible and
reliable11 identification. As such, the
statute vests virtually complete discretion
in the hands of the police to determine
whether the suspect has satisfied the
statute . . . . An individual • . • is
entitled to continue to walk the public
streets "only at the whim of any police
officer" who happens to stop that individual
. . . . (Citations omitted).
Id.
In short, because the statute before it failed to
"establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement" and
thus "vest[ed] virtually complete discretion in the hands of
the police", the Court held was that it was void-for-vagueness
and contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Accord Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566# 574-75 (1974).

For reasons similar to the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Kolender, this court has invalidated a statute
creating a governmental authority but which failed to prescribe
the authority's territorial boundaries and set no definite
standards or limitations on the authority granted.

Great Salt

Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d
504, 505 (1966).
The Subpoena Act, like the statute in Kolender, vests
virtually complete discretion in the hands of law enforcement,
and fails to establish minimum guidelines to govern their
conduct.

The Subpoena Act wholly fails the Kolender "minimal

guidelines" test because it permits the prosecutor to require
the production of documents and other items "which constitute
evidence which may be relevant to the investigation in the
judgment of the attorney general or the county attorney."
(emphasis added).

The Subpoena Act fails to answer, however,

how and within what parameters the judgment of the attorney
general or county attorney must be exercised.

The Subpoena Act

supplies no guidance or standard whatever for the exercise of
such extraordinary power.
It is thus vulnerable, like the statute in Kolender,
because it permits the prosecutor to determine at his whim what
may be relevant to the court-authorized investigation.

Due to

the vast discretion conferred, the Subpoena Act indeed
"furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular
groups who merit their displeasure.'(citations omitted)".
Kolender, id. at 911.
The Subpoena Act f s secrecy provisions are likewise
unconstitutionally vague.

The Act provides that if requested

by the prosecutor, the district court "may order that
interrogation of any witness shall be held in secret; that such
proceeding be secret; and that the record of testimony be kept
secret unless and until the court for good cause otherwise
orders."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3(3) (1982).

The Act

completely fails to specify, however, what it means "that such
proceeding be secret/'
The Attorney General has apparently already
interpreted and applied this vague language in a way that
impinges on fundamental rights.

Toward the end of the

deposition of Darcie H. White, Assistant Attorney General Olsen
admonished the witness as follows:

"I would just remind you

that the proceedings here, the questions, etc., are secret.
They certainly may be discussed with Mr. Nebeker, but not with
others.11

See Addendum II.
Mr. Nebeker then took issue with the Attorney

General's view of the secrecy provision, indicating he did not
interpret the statute to prevent the witness from discussing
3
his deposition with others. Id.
At best, the Act's secrecy provisions fail to set out
with sufficient clarity whether the secret nature of the
proceedings prevents a witness from discussing his deposition
with others afterwards.

Unlike the Utah grand jury statute,

which states explicitly that no one "may disclose or be

*
Assistant Attorney General Dallimore expressed
the following interpretation of the secrecy provision: "Well,
Steve, I think, at a minimum, it would be better for everyone
concerned if a lot of people didn't do a lot of talking to each
other about these proceedings and, specifically, of course, if
Mr. Fletcher called you on the phone, don't you think it would
be more appropriate that it not be discussed?" Id. at 164.

compelled to disclose what he or any grand juror or other
person may have said'1 during a grand jury proceeding, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-11-10(1) (1982), the Subpoena Act fails to set forth
any guidelines in this regard.

Particularly where, as here,

the Act's vagueness is subject to an interpretation by the
Attorney General that potentially impinges on the First
Amendment right of free speech of interrogated witnesses, the
statute must be declared unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
Finally, the Subpoena Act is unconstitutionally vague
because it fails to establish minimal guidelines with respect
to the constitutionally required procedural safeguards to be
afforded a witness to an investigation.

While the Attorney

General contends that the self-incrimination and target
warnings required by this Court in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d
216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967) in the grand jury context, may also be
implied in the language of the Subpoena Act (A.G.'s Br. at
37-40), the fact is the required warnings are absent from the
statute and the Attorney General has hitherto refused to give
them.
at 4-6.

See Addendum II, Excerpts from Darcie White Deposition
In fact, the Attorney General argues that Ruggeri

warnings are not required under the Subpoena Act at all.
A.G.'s Br. at 27-35.

Thus, the Attorney General's own analysis

and application of the Subpoena Act leads to the conclusion
that the statute is too ambiguous to adequately guide the

Attorney General, who is only one of thirty prosecutorial
bodies empowered to conduct criminal investigations.
V.

IT IS NOT A JUDICIAL FUNCTION TO REWRITE A STATUTE BY
INTERPRETATION.
It is a well established rule that legislative

enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity
and that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional if
there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found to
come within the constitutional framework.
528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974).

Greaves v. State,

However, this presumption of

validity is a rebuttable one.

Courts are under a duty to say

what the law is; even if that means rendering void a statute
passed by the legislature.
Where a statute affects or may encroach upon
fundamental personal liberties, a stricter judicial scrutiny is
required and the presumption of validity is more easily
overcome.

This court has recognized this limitation on the

presumptive validity of statutes on several occasions.

In Re

Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981); Allen v. Trueman, 37 Utah
528, 110 P.2d 356 (1941).
The Utah Court in Greaves v. State, supra, while
upholding a statute in the face of a vagueness challenge, also
noted that the focus in such a challenge must be on the
language of a statute:

A statute will not be declared unconstitutional
• . . if under any sensible interpretation of
its language it can be given practical effect,
(emphasis added.)
Id. at 807.

In the case at hand, it is the absence of language

that constitutes the Subpoena Act f s fatal flaw.
Judge Bunnell in his May 30, 1984 order read into the
Subpoena Act a requirement of target and self incrimination
warnings.

See Addendum III.

The Attorney General says these

warnings, if required, may be incorporated into the statute by
implication or interpretation.

A.G. Br. at 37-40.

Such an

implication or interpretation finds no basis in the language of
the statute.
Unless statutory language is ambiguous, a court may
not supply through interpretation a statutory omission without
transcending the judicial function.

Park v. Edgewater, Inc. v.

Joy, 416 N.Y.S.2d 266, 68 A.D.2d 107 (1979).
province of the Court to draft legislation.
v, Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968).

It is not the
Interstate Circuit

"The absence of narrowly

drawn, and reasonable and definite standards for the officials
to follow (citations omitted) is fatal."

Ld.

See also United

States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
This court has also recognized that supplying omitted
language or otherwise rewriting a statute in an effort to
validate it is not an appropriate judicial function.

In

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 107 Utah 530, 155 P.2d 184 (1945), this court
observed "the interpretation must be based on the language
used, and . . . the court has no power to rewrite a statute to
make it conform to an intention not expressed."

155 P.2d at

185.
The foregoing decisions are founded on the principles
underlying the American system of tri-partite government.
is the judicial function to apply and interpret the law.
the province of the legislature to make the law.

It
It is

Marbury v.

Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Calhoun County v. Galbraith, 99
U.S. 214 (1878).

It is the legislature's prerogative to

establish those standards necessary to bring prosecutorial
subpoena power in line with the Constitution.
The Attorney General argues that the courts may supply
procedures omitted by the legislature, and cites In Re
Barnett's Estate, 275 P. 453 (Cal. 1929) for the concept that a
court cannot supply omissions in a statute which are of a
substantive nature, but may supply procedures.
p. 37.

A.G.'s Br.,

Respondents submit that the constitutional right to a

Miranda warning is a substantive right, and not merely a
procedure.

The Attorney General says that the courts in

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and State v.

Ruggeri,

19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967) are excellent examples of a

procedure being implied into a statute.

In each of those cases

the lawfulness of a statute was not at issue, rather it was the
safeguards provided in police interrogation, on one hand, and
the grand jury on the other.

It is notable that shortly

following the Ruggeri decision, the Utah legislature enacted
the safeguards required therein.
(1982).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3

It is not the judicial function for a court to rewrite

the Subpoena Act to incorporate substantive judicial safeguards
which the legislature failed to include.
VI.

THE SUBPOENA ACT SHOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
ITS FACE.
Although the Subpoena Act has been abused, and in

Judge Bunnell's words, "allows for an absolute abuse of power,11
and although the Attorney General apparently concedes it has
resulted in the violation of Fourth Amendment rights, see
A.G.'s Br. at 39, the Attorney General argues that this is no
reason to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face.

The

Attorney General takes refuge in his view that the power
granted prosecutors by the Subpoena Act should be treated just
like the power conferred on law enforcement officers generally
to obtain a search warrant, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23-1 et se%.

(1982):

[T]he remedy for the single violation of a
citizen's Fourth Amendment right is not a
ruling that the Act under which the

violation occurred is unconstitutional.
Instead, it is the suppression of evidence,
if the violation is substantial and not in
good faith, § 77-35-12(g), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
A.G.'s Br. at 39.
The Attorney General argues, with some persuasiveness,
that a statute conferring authority on governmental officials
should not automatically be held unconstitutional simply
because it may, in certain circumstances, result in the
violation of constitutional rights. Clearly, the government
must have authority to conduct searches and make arrests, and
cannot be denied this authority altogether simply because, in
some circumstances, it may do these things in an
unconstitutional manner.
A.

Unlike the Search Warrant Statute, the Subpoena Act
Requires No Prior Judicial Approval of Subpoenas
Issued Under Its Authority.
By simply likening the Subpoena Act to the search

warrant statute, however, the Attorney General glosses over
significant differences between those statutes.

First, a

search warrant cannot be issued unless probable cause is first
demonstrated to an impartial magistrate.
§ 77-23-1, et seq. (1982).

Utah Code Ann.

The statutorily required need for

prior judicial authorization to conduct a search greatly
diminishes the possibility of constitutional violations
perpetrated under the search warrant statute.

B

*

The Subpoena Act Contains No Effective Deterrent
Against Its Improper Application.
Secondly, the remedy of exclusion of unconstitutionally

obtained evidence, while it may provide an effective deterrent
to unconstitutional searches, provides no effective deterrent
to the "fishing expedition" sanctioned under the Subpoena Act.
Under Utah's statutory enactment of the "exclusionary rule",
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982), an effective deterrent
exists to prevent police investigating discrete criminal
conduct from conducting a search without first obtaining a
warrant from a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.
The specific evidence of the suspected crime under
investigation may not be usable if the statutory procedures are
not followed.
It is far from clear, however, that this statute would
ever deter a prosecutor, interested in roaming the files and
records of a Utah citizen from doing so. While the police most
often use the search warrant statute to find evidence of
specific criminal conduct, a prosecutor is more apt to use the
Subpoena Act to find evidence of criminality that was
previously unsuspected.

The exclusionary rule is not an

effective deterrent to this type of abuse.
C.

The Subpoena Act Encourages Prosecutors to Use It
Improperly.
Finally, and most importantly, the Subpoena Act should

not be upheld because, although it may be possible to apply it

constitutionally, the very language and structure of the
Subpoena Act encourages the prosecutor to apply it in an
abusive and unconstitutional way.

It should therefore be

declared unconstitutional on its face.

This is a practical

necessity especially when 29 county attorneys are vested with
the powers of the Subpoena Act along with the Attorney General.
It may not be appropriate in every case to declare a
statute facially unconstitutional simply because some of the
applications contemplated within its language may impinge on
constitutional rights.
U.S. 601, 613 (1973).

See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
However, the United States Supreme Court

has held that a statute should be held facially
unconstitutional if it reaches

M

a substantial amount of

constitutionally protected conduct."
Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).

Hoffman Estates v.
Applying this principle,

the Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903
(1983), discussed at length in Part IV supra, impelled by its
concern that "the statute vests virtually complete discretion
in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute," i_d. at 909, did not hesitate to declare
the statute facially unconstitutional, even though the statute
at issue there clearly had several constitutional
applications.

See id. at 910, n. 8.

Respondents submit that the statute here, like the
statute in Kolender, should be declared unconstitutional on its

face.

Not only, due to the vast discretion it confers, does

the statute reach "a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct," Hoffman, supra at 494, it literally
encourages the prosecutor to exploit it in an abusive and
unconstitutional manner.

The Subpoena Act vests a vaguely

defined and far-reaching power of investigation in thirty
prosecutors, each with a sworn duty to obtain convictions and
put people in jail.

In their zeal to fulfill this function,

all of these prosecutors cannot reasonably be expected to apply
it in a way that safeguards constitutional rights.
If the statute is not declared facially
unconstitutional, the court is virtually inviting the
prosecutor to continue to use the statute in the manner it has
been applied already, with little regard for constitutional
boundaries.

Where a statute has been applied

unconstitutionally, and further invites and encourages such
unconstitutional application, respondents submit it must be
declared invalid on its face.
VII. THE SUBPOENA ACT RUNS AFOUL OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE.
As more fully discussed in the record below, the
Subpoena Act is not of recent vintage.

Rather, the Subpoena

Act is a revision of a former statute enacted in 1971 (codified
in Chapter 45 of Title 77 as §§ 19, 20 and 21, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) (the "Former Act").

See Addendum I at iv.

Under the

Former Act, a prosecutor could not issue a subpoena without
obtaining prior approval of the district court.

.Id. This

judicial restraint was imposed on prosecuting attorneys by the
1971 Legislature for the purpose of avoiding a constitutional
attack similar to the ones made in the case at bar.
IV at xlii-xlv, xlvii-1.

Addendum

It was eliminated from the Subpoena

Act in the 1980 budget session of the legislature as part of
the recodification of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. Id.,
at lix-lxxxiv.
A review of the legislature debates surrounding the
Former Act indicates that judicial approval of subpoenas was
deemed an essential constitutional safeguard in the minds of
the 1971 Legislature.

No mention was made of the removal of

this procedure during the 1980 budget session at which time the
Subpoena Act was enacted.

Rather, legislators urged the

passage of the bill containing the Subpoena Act with the
warning that "[t]he Bill's not perfect . . . but the need to
have this occur is so great and we are so hamstrung now with
the confusion regarding the rules of the game . . . "
passage is required.

that its

Id., at lx.

The Subpoena Act violates the "one-subject rule" found
in Article VI, § 22 of the Utah Constitution which requires
that, except for bills providing for the codification and
general revision of laws, "no bill shall be passed containing

more than one subject . . . "

Contrary to the

characterizations of the 1980 legislators, the Subpoena Act is
not a codification of laws.

Where a statute, such as the

Former Act, is codified or recodified, it is presumed to be
enacted without change, even though it is reworded and
rephrased.

See, e.g., C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory

Construction, § 28.10 at 327 (1972).

The Subpoena Act contains

numerous changes from the Former Act and is thus not excluded
from the application of the one-subject rule as a codification.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, respondents Karl J.
Stott, Norman Maxfield, and Orrin T. Colby, Jr., respectfully
request this Court to affirm the district court's decision
holding the Subpoena Act unconstitutional.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2 ^

day of February,

1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK, & MpDONOUGH

By:
Dbnald B. y&olbrook
Attorneys for Respondents
Karl J. Stott, Norman Maxfield,
and Orrin T. Colby, Jr.
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ADDENDUM I
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
casesc In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to

-i-

testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
SUBPOENA ACT
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-22-1 through 77-22-3
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It is
declared, as a matter of legislative determination,
that it is necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid
of criminal investigations and to provide a method of
keeping information gained from investigations secret
both to protect the innocent and to prevent criminal
suspects from having access to information prior to
prosecution and to clarify the power of the attorney
general and county attorneys to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses whose testimony is essential
to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and require
production of evidence — Contents of subpoena
Interrogation before closed court. (1) In any matter
involving the investigation of a crime, the existence
of a crime or malfeasance in office or any criminal
conspiracy or activity, the attorney general or any
county attorney shall have the right, upon application
and approval of the district court, for good cause
shown, to conduct an investigation in which the
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel their
attendance and testimony under oath before any
certified court reporter, and require the production
of books, papers, documents, recordings and any other
items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney
general or county attorney.
-ii-

(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of
possible defendants and need only contain notification
that the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of
criminal investigation and state the time and place of
the examination/ which may be conducted anywhere
within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing the
subpoena, and inform the party served that he is
entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees
and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney
may take written application to any district court and
the court may order that interrogation of any witness
shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be
secret; and that the record of testimony be kept
secret unless and until the court for good cause
otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from
any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons
except the attorneys representing the state and
members of their staffs, the court reporter and the
attorney for the witness.
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witness — Refusal
of witness to testify or produce evidence — Powers
granted prosecuting attorneys in addition to other
powers. In any investigation or prosecution of a
criminal case, the attorney general and any county
attorney shall have the power to grant transactional
immunity from prosecution to any person who is called
or who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf
of the state whenever the attorney general or county
attorney deems that the testimony of such persons is
necessary to the investigation or prosecution of such
a case. No prosecution shall be instituted against
the person for any crime disclosed by his testimony
which is privileged under this action, provided that
should the person testify falsely, nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent prosecution
for perjury.
If during the investigation or prosecution a
person refuses to answer a question or produce
evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the
subpoena may file a request in writing with the
district court in which the examination is being
conducted for an order requiring that person to answer
-iii-

the question or produce the evidence requested. The
court shall set a time for hearing and order the
person to appear before the court to show cause, if
any he has, why the question should not be answered or
the evidence produced, and the court shall order the
question answered or the evidence practiced unless it
finds that to do so would be clearly contrary to the
public interest, or could subject the witness to a
criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction. If the
witness still refuses to answer or produce the
evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt of court and
punished accordingly. If the witness complies with
the order and he would have been privileged to
withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by
him except for this section, that person shall not be
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on
account of any fact or act concerning which, he was
ordered to answer or produce evidence except he may
nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for
any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or
failing to produce any evidence in accordance with the
order.
The powers specified in this chapter are in
addition to any other powers granted to the attorney
general or county attorneys.
FORMER SUBOPENA ACT EFFECTIVE 1971
Section 1.

Purpose —

Subpoena Powers.

It is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination that there has been a marked increase in
crime and criminal activity within this state, and
that in order to protect the public health, safety,
and morals, it is necessary to grant subpoena powers
in aid of criminal investigations conducted by the
attorney general, district attorneys and county
attorneys, and to provide a method of keeping
information gained from investigations secret both to
protect the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects
from having access to information prior to prosecution
to the detriment of the proper enforcement of the
criminal laws of this state, and to clarify the power
of the attorney general, district attorneys, and
county attorneys to grant immunity from prosecution of
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witnesses whose testimony is essential to the proper
conduct of an investigation of criminal activities and
prosecution of crimes committed within this state.
Section 2. Subpoena Powers —
— Court Procedure,

Procedural Requisites

In any matter involving the investigation of a
crime, the existence of a crime, or any criminal
conspiracy or activity, the attorney general, any
district attorney or any county attorney shall have
the right, upon application and approval of the
district court for good cause shown, to subpoena
witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under
oath before any certified court reporter, and require
the production of books, papers, documents, records
and other tangible items which constitute or may
contain evidence which is or may be relevant or
material to the investigation in the judgment of the
attorney general, district attorney or county attorney.
The subpoena need not disclose the name or namesof possible defendants and need only contain
notification that the testimony of the witness is
sought in aid of a criminal investigation and state
the time and place of the examination, which may be
conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the
attorney issuing the subpoena, and inform the party
served that he is entitled to be represented by
counsel. V7itness fees and expenses shall be tendered
and paid as in any civil action.
In addition to the foregoing rights and powers to
compel attendance and obtain evidence, the attorney
general, any district attorney, or any county attorney
may make written application to any district court and
the court may order that interrogation of any witness
shall be before a closed court; that such proceeding
be secret; and that the record of such testimony be
kept secret unless and until the court for good cause
otherwise orders. The court shall have the power to
exclude from any investigative hearing or proceeding,
any and all persons except the attorneys representing
the state and members of their staffs, the court
reporter, and the attorney for the witness.

-v-

GRAND JURY STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-11-3
77-11-3. Evidence receivable - Witness to be
advised of rights. (1) The grand jury shall receive
no other evidence than is given by witnesses under
oath or affirmation, or documentary evidence, or the
deposition of a witness taken as provided by law. The
grand jury shall receive only legal evidence.
(2) Any person called to testify before the
grand jury may be advised of his right to be
represented by counsel. If a witness is or becomes a
subject of the investigation, he shall be advised of
that fact and of his right to counsel, and of his
privilege against self incrimination. On demand of a
witness for representation by counsel, the proceedings
shall be delayed until counsel is present. In the
event that counsel of the witness* choice is not
available, he shall be required to obtain or accept
other counsel.

-vi-

f."~«fl •S*??.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34114
Telephone: (801) 533-7626
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF A

:

SUBr-OSNA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

:

C3 NO. I

THE STATE 0? UTAH TO:
Crrin T. Colby
14C7 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-5

335-4040

You are hereby commanded to set a^ide ail business
and excuses and appear at the Office of ':he Attorney General
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Laics City,
Utah, at the hour of -' -'^ -> .m. , on
A

,• fU

J i -

day of

A

i'^J/i

i

^:•=«'* -

the

1984, to give testimony

J

in support of a criminal investigation.
be represented by legal counsel.
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You are entitled to

You are also commanded to bring with you any and
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers
pertaining to Utah Power and Light to include, but not be
limited to:

information and documentation regarding all

uranium properties purchased, controlled and managed by Utah
Power and Light; a detailed reconciliation of all changes in
balances for all uranium properties as reflected in reports
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for the years
1979 and 1930 to include all of the detailed documentation
(vouchers, checks, etc*) reflecting and supporting reported
increases in balances for ail uranium properties from 1979
to 1930.
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order
of the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court*
it

Given under my hand this

-tU

day of April, 1934.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
By:

^ q ^ / . U , ry/y^2_^STANLEY) H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
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ril'tU
!"<* Vr.c. SiVIMTH JUuJCIAL 0iSTKiCT C0Uf:T
OF UTAH .*• /«W TOR EMcllV CO.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34114
Telephone: (801) 533-7626
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

CS NO. 1

THE STATS OF UTAH TO:
Norman Maxfield
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah, 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at the hour of #'*&<&• .a.. on

12, 4,

day of

A?"/

^rrir(&^

the

., 1984, to give testimony

in support of a criminal investigation.
be represented by legal counsel.
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You are entitled to

_ C:.-rk
.Deputy

You are also commanded to bring with you any and
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers
pertaining to Mike Thompson, Mike Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, et
al., MTA.Vanguard, Great Basin Patrol, and L. Brent
Fletcher.
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order
of the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court.
Given under my hand this ^W^ day of April; 1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division

tiA am

A

STANLEY|H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

i 3 I K tU Hw
-c .k'VEHTH JultlCiAL DIST^CT vttH

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL H. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division
STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 34114
Telephone; (301) 533-7625
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF A

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

CS NO. 1

THE STATE OF UTAH TO:
Karl J.Stott
1407 West North Tesiple
Salt Mice City, Utah 84115

525-2823

You ara hereby camaanded co sat aside all business
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah, 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at the hour of-

•4.
^Wday of

. m,,. on
M l

/'-V5c^ _,

., 1984, to give testimony

in support of a criminal investigation.
be represented by legal counsel.

., the

You are entitled to

You are also commanded to bring with you any and
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers
pertaining to Utah Power and Light to include, but not be
limited to:

information and documentation regarding all

uranium properties purcnased? controlled and managed by Utah
Power and Light; a detailed reconciliation of ail changes in
balances for all uranium properties as reflected in reports
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for the years
1373 and 1980 to include all of the detailed documentation
(vouchers, checks, etc*) reflecting and supporting reported
increases in balances for ail uranium properties from 1379
to 1S80.
This subpoena duces tecum is authorised by order
of the District Court.

Disobedience to this order is

punishable by contempt of Court.
Given under my hand this

U+\

day of April, 1934

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistanc Attorney General
Chigt,
Litigation Division

By:

AMlM

STANLSya. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah

Darcie White Deposition

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-OOo-

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

:

Case No. CS No. 1

:

Deposition of:

:

DARCIE H. WHITE

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of April, 1984,
the deposition of DARCIE H. WHITE, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the Attorney Generalfs office,
in the above-entitled action now pending in the above-named
Court, was taken before Rashell Garcia, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 9; 00 a.m. of said day, at the
offices of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, State of Utah.

That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena,
-oOo-

ORIGINAL

RASHELL GARCIA
LICENSE #144

INDEPENDENT
REPORTING
SERVICE
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
«*lt I *!<• Citu Utah 84111

801-322-1029

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Attorney
General's Office:

STANLEY H. OLSEN
SUZANNE DALLIMORE
Assistant Attorney Generals
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
WAYNE WICKIZER
Special Investigator
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

For the Witness

STEPHEN NEBEKER
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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-oOo11

I N D E X
12

Witness
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Examination by Mr. Olsen
Examination by Ms. Dallimore
Continued Examination by Ms. Dallimore
Further Examination by Mr, Olsen
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Exhibits

Marked

Agreement dated 2/28/78 between UP&L and MTA
Agreement dated 3/81 between UP&L and MTA
Agreement dated 10/1/82 between UP&L and MTA
Security Services, Inc.
Memo dated 2/10/78 from MTA
Overview reDort dated 9/1/78 from MTA
Letter from Mr. Fletcher dated 11/19/81
Letter dated 1/29/83 from Dennis Cole
Task force report dated 4/15/83
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P R O C E E D I N G S
MS. OLSEN:

This is the time set for the deposition)

of Mr* Darcie White pursuant to a subpoena given to
Mr. Stephen. Nebeker, his counsel.

Steve, you delivered that

to Mr* White and are here pursuant to that subpoena; is that
correct?
MR, NEBEKER:
MR. OLSENt

That's correct.
Let me just indicate who is present.

Steve Nebeker is here reprsenting Mr. Darcie White.

Stan

Olsen from the Attorney General's office, and Ms. Suzanne
Dallimore -- and why don't you spell that.
MS. DALLIMORE:
MR. OLSENs

D-a-1-l-i-m-o-r-e.

And Wayne Wickizer, investigator with

the office of the Attorney General.
Before we went on the record, we had a discussion
concerning the questioning in this case.

For the record, I

want to indicate that I will be asking the questions to a
certain point in time, and then at the time when it will be
my intention to turn the questioning over to either Suzanne
or Wayne, then I think it would be appropriate at that time
for us to put on the record our respective positions in that
regard.

Steve, if you have any statement, go ahead.
MR. NEBEKER:

Fine.

First of all, I would like to

ask if in fact this is being conducted pursuant to the
criminial investigative docket that's been opened up in

3

1

Emery County?

2

MR. OLSEN:

It is.

3

MR. NEBEKER:

And the subpoena carried that

4] designation on it, did it not?
5
6

MR. OLSEN:

That's my understanding.

correct, Wayne?

7

MR. WICKIZER:

8

MR. NEBEKER:

9
10
11

Is that

Yes.
Secondly, I would like to ask you on

the record if in fact Mr. Darcie White who has been subpoenaejd
here is a target in the investigation?
MR. OLSEN:

Right.

My response to that, as it was

12

off the record, is that we intend to ask Mr. White a series

13

of questions concerning his employment and relationships with!

14

not only his current employer but with previous employees and)

15

contractors with Utah Power & Light.

16

specific answer to give than that.

17

MR. NEBEKER:

I don't have a more

Can you state more specifically

18

whether or not he is in fact being considered as a target of

19

the investigation?

20

MR. OLSEN:

There isn't a way for me to be more

21

specific than that.

I think it is fair to say that as we

22

continue the investigation, that all persons who we've become;

23

aware of or interview or depose, that we would review their

24

depositions or information that we gain about those persons

25

and review their potential criminal liability.

That's as

1

specific as I'm able to be.

2

MR. NEBEKER:

Well, for the record, I think I would)

3

say that I donft think that response is adequate because I

4

think he's entitled to know whether or not he is the subject

5

of a criminal investigation.

6

time, be required to tell him whether or not he is the subjecjt

7

of the investigation because I think certain questions that

8

may be put to him may require him to take the Fifth Amendment!

9

if he deems it necessary.

10

>*R. OLSEN:

I think you should, at this

I think he's entitled to know thad

I understand that concern and I'm being

11

as candid as I can.

12

if there is a question asked, for example, if he did anything

13

which we may later look at as being a potential criminal

14

violation, then we would look at it and review it with a

15

view to potential prosecution.

16

candid as I can about that.

17

as to any person that we have absolutely eliminated that

18

specific person.' We have not done, nor, I think, can we

19

legitimately do that.

20

there.

21

at this point«

22

I think it's fair to say, Steve, that

I'm honestly being as

I don't know that we have said

I'm honestly not holding back anything

That's my response and we're not eliminating anyone

MR. NEBEKER:

Well, if that's all you're willing

21

to put on the record, then I guess we'll just have to let

24

the record stand as it is, but my position is that he's

25

entitled to know that.

I think the Attorney General's offic*

1

should be required to tell him that.

2
3
4
5
5
7
8 I
9
10

EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q

Mr. White, I wonder if you would give us your full

name and the spelling of each of the names, please.
A

Okay, my name is Darcie, D-a-r-c-i-e, middle initiajl

H, White, W-h-i-t-e.
Q

Mr. White, what is your business and home addresses^,

please?
A

My business address is 1407 West North Temple,

11

Salt Lake City.

12

in Salt Lake City.

13
14
15

Q

My home address is 2817 Cherry Blossom Lane

Would you give

us your telephone numbers as well,

please.
A

At the office, my business phone is 535-2460.

At

16 I home, it's 277-9797.
17

Q

Could you give

18

A

September 20, 1926.

19

Q

If you would, give us the name of your current

20

us your date of birth?

employer?

21

A

Utah Power & Light Company.

22

Q

How long have you been employed with Utah Dower &

23

Light?

24

A

Just short of 34 years,

25

Q

What is your current position?

also discussed that he had been up here for his deposition.
Did he express some concern over the deposition and the
pending investigation?
A

Only the fact that it had taken place.

He didn8t

give me any details or any specific concerns.
Q

Mr* White, did you have -- let me ask it this way:

Do you have reason or did you, at any time, have reason to
suspect that Mr. Fletcher may have been benefiting outside
his UP&L salary from his contractual relationship —

from the}

security contracts that we've discussed during this depositicf
A

I never had any concern about that.

Q

Have you read Mr. Fletcher's deposition that was

given?
A

Have you read his deposition he gave in this office?
No, I have note

I only know he told me he had

given a deposition*
0

Just a summary question, Mr. White.

In terms of

the negotiation of the initial contract, was its signing
on your behalf recommended by Mr. Fletcher?
A

The contract was recommended by Mr. Fletcher

subsequent to a review by our Legal Department that it was
in the company's interest.
MR. NEBEKERs

I did sign it.

It seems to me we've been over this

a couple of times.
THE WITNESS.Q

I think we have*

(By Mr. Olsen) Anyone else other than Mr* Fletcher
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1 other than the legal people who made the recommendation?
2
3
4

5

A

Well, of course Mr. Fletcher's supervisor recommended

it, also.
Q

Then Mr. Maxfield and Mr. Fletcher recommended its

signing by the company and review by the Legal Department?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Would that have been true as to the third contract,

8
9

then?
A

I don't specifically recall talking to Mr. Maxfieldj

10 about that, but I'm sure it went through the same process.
U

Q

Did Mr. pletcher recommend that?

12

A

He did.

13

Q

Are you familiar with where Mr. Fletcher resides?

'*

A

I believe, though I'm not sure, that he lives in

15 j Bountiful.
16

Q

Have you been to his home?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Mr. White, let me just remind you of something that

19 Steve may well have talked to you about, but for purposes of
20 making sure that we're clear on this, the proceedings here
21

are pursuant to an investigative subpoena and are under a

"

secrecy order.

I would just remind you that the proceedings

23 here, the questions, etc., are secret.
24

They certainly may

be discussed with Mr. Nebeker but not with others.

25 question I have is —

The other

well, let me ask you if you understand
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that.
MR. NEBEKER: Let me ask you on what authority
you're telling him that he can't discuss this with anyone?
MR* OLSEN:

Pursuant to the secrecy order,,

MR. NEBEKER:
MR. OLSEN:

I didn't see a copy of that-

Well, I guess my question is does he

understand that -MR. NEBEKER: No f he does not understand that.
THE WITNESS:

No, I didn't.

MR. NEBEKER:

We have never been served with a copy

of that order. .
MS. DALLIMORE:

There's a statute that requires

that all procedures be kept secret that we take pursuant to
criminal subpoenaes unless the witness waives his right to
keep them secrete
MR. OLSEN:

I think we sent you a copy of that

as well, Steve.
MR. NEBEKER:
MR. OLSEN:

The secrecy order?

Yes.

MR. NEBEKER:

I've never seen it.

I have, I don't have it in my file.

At least, if

Is it the order signed

by Judge Bunnell?
MR. OLSEN:

Yes.

MRc NEBEKER?

The last one he signed?

Is that the

one we're referring to?
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*

MR. OLSEN:

We're not talking about the deletion

2

of the name, we're talking about the initial secrecy order,

3

a copy of which was supplied to you.

4

again.

^

MR. NEBEKER:

I'd be glad to do it

Well, I may have really just not seen

*

that but the order that I have here —

7

one you're referring to, the one dated January 26, 1983.

8
9

MR. OLSEN:
I

That's the one.

M*. NEBEKER:

10

MR. OLSEN:

II

MR. NEBEKER:

maybe this is the

And this is from Judge Bunnell.
Correct.
It says that "hereby orders that the

12 J proceedings and record in the above-entitled

investigation

'3 I may be kept secret and any and all persons may be excluded
'* I from access."

My understanding is that simply seals the

15

file.

16

Mr. White can speak to anybody besides me as the attorney fori

17

the company.

18

he has talked to Mr. Eliason and, in fact, talked to him

19

yesterday after the deposition.

I don't have any understanding that, for instance,

I think we better have that understood because}

20

MR. OLSEN:

21

MR. NEBEKER:

22

MR. OLSEN:

23
24
25

Well, I guess we'll just have to
Are you telling me

—

—

I guess we'll have to disagree about

that.
MR. NEBEKER:

Are you saying that this order says

that these people cannot talk to anvone?

Is that how you're

1

interpreting this?

2

MR. OLSEN:

3

the attorney, that is correct.

4

Well, I think with the exception of

MR. NEBEKER:

I don't know what the

—

I just read it entirely different,,

5

It says "Based upon the above application of Attorney General

6

and documents on file herein, aood cause appearing:

7

hereby ordered that the proceedings and records in the above-j

3

entitled investigation mav be secret" —

9

"and that any and all nersons may be excluded from access

It is

may be secret

~

10

to any such proceedings or record except the attorneys

11

representing the State of Utah and members of their staff,

12

the court reporter that witnessed, and the attorney for the

13

witness".

14

MS. DALLIMORE;

Well, Steve, I think, at a minimum

15

it would be better for everyone concerned if a lot of people

16

didn't do a lot of talking to each other about these

17

proceedings and, specifically, of course, if Mr. Fletcher

18

called you on the phone, don't you think it would be more

19

appropriate that it not be discussed?

20

MR. NEBEKER:

Outside of this court order, which

21

we understand has been issued by the Court, I guess each

22

person has to interpret that and if you interpret that as

23

saying to Mr. White that he can't talk to anyone about this

24

except me, then I think I need to know that because I don't

25

—

we don't want to violate the Court order but, on the otheif
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1

hand, I think this simply says that the record and proceeding^

2

are to be kept secret.

3

in Emery County and part of it is sealed and part of it is

4

not sealed, as you're probably aware.

5

MR. OLSEN:

6

MR. NEBEKER:

In fact, we have looked at the file

Sure.
And so all of the file is not even

7

being kept secret.

3

entitled at the company to talk to each other.

9

saying that they cannot do that, maybe we better have an

JO

understanding there, and I think maybe we better find out

11

from the Judge if that is the way this is to be conducted.

12
13

I'm not sure that these people aren't

MR. OLSEN:

If you're

I suppose we can have another conversa-

tion with him.

14

MR. NEBEKER:

I mean, I just don't want to get

15

these peoole in violation of a court order and have them

16

for instance, Mr. White talked to Norm Maxfield and then

17

have you, in effect, say to these people, You shouldn't do

18

that.

19

but I have not understood that up until now because I've

20

talked to Mr. White and I've talked to Mr. Eliason.

21

have spoken to each other, merely because they happened to

22

be here at the same time, one was coming and one was leaving.

If they're not to do it, we better tell them now,

23

MR. OLSEN:

24

MR. NEBEKER:

25

—

They

Sure, I understand.
We don't intend to violate the

court order, but we need to have an understanding on the
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1

basic ground rules as to how the investigation is being

2

conducted.

3

and myself as attorney for the company, I think we need to

4

have that clarified.

5

be corrected by the Judge.

Merely for the sake of protecting these people

5
7

MR. OLSEN:
clarify and we're

8
9

If I'm wrong, then I certainly could

It's something we should perhaps

—

MR. NEBEKER:

Let me say he has no way of controlli^i<

if Mr. Fletcher calls him.

10

MS. DALLIMORE:

II

MR. NEBEKER:

Certainly not.
Or if Mr. Ziemski calls or if

12

Mr. Wall calls him.

I don't know whether those people

—

13

what instructions they have been given.

14

came back and talked to Mr. White after his deDosition.

Mr. Fletcher himself|
He

15 I apparently was not under any concept that he was not to talk
16

to anyone.

So, I merelv state that on the record because I

17

think it's important for us to know where we stand with

18

regard to that.

19

& Light or its employees to violate any of the court orders

20

in connection with this criminal investigation, but I think

21

we are entitled to know the questions I have already asked

22

which I think have not been answered as to who is the subjectj

21

of this investigation and, further, I think we're entitled

24

to know now that you are claiming that they cannot talk to

25

each other.

I think it is not the intent of Utah Power

i fifi

1

MR. OLSEN:

Well, I think we have already stated

2

what our position is on that and if we want to try to reach

3

the Judge again today, as we did before, we can do that, or

4

we can try to reach him by conference call at a later time.

5

MR. NEBEKER:

5

MR. OLSEN:

All right.
The only other question I have

and,

7

perhaps you have questions, Steve, but my last question is

3

to ask whether you have any additional statements or clarifi-]

9

cations that you would like to make, Mr. White, about what's

10
11 I
12

been testified to?
MR. NEBEKER:
already been?

13

MR. OLSEN:

14

MR. NEBEKER:

15

MR. OLSEN:

Yes.

lg

he would like to make.

17

MR. NEBEKER:

18
19

In terms of what his testimony has

Any corrections?
.Any corrections or any other statements]

Now, wait a minute.

I don't think

it's proper to ask him just to make a statement on the record)
MR. OLSEN:

I'm not asking him to.

My question

20

was does he want to make corrections or does he want to make

21

any other statement.

22

I'm asking if he wants to, that's all.

23

MR. NEBEKER:

I'm not saying to make a statement,

Do you understand what they're saying)

24

If you have anything you think needs to be corrected, you're

25

certainly entitled to make any corrections.

You will have
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1 a chance to read your deposition.
2

THE WITNESS:

Sure.

3

MR. NEBEKER:

If I understand your question, you're

*

asking him if he wants to make any other comments on question^

5

that have been asked, and I'm qoing to instruct him not to

6

answer that.

7

MR. OLSEN:

*
9

I don't think that's a proper question.
It's not a question so much, Steve,

as an invitation to —I

MR. NEBEKER:

!0 respondc
U

I'm going to instruct him not to

I don't want him to respond to an open-ended request

like that.

12

MR. OLSEN:

I understand that, and that's all I

13 J have.
14

MS. DALLIMORE:

One other matter, and that is

15

concerning documents.

16

identified today that we would like to see copies of are

,7

I the assignment of contract and Mr. Fletcher's manuals and

*8 I writings.

The only documents I think we have

Also, if he made security manuals, reports or

*9 ' those kinds of things
20

MR. NEBEKER:

21

Now, I think in terms of Mr. Fletcher

manuals, you better subpoena those.

I don't know if we have

22

I those.

23

• executed, I think within the last month, I guess we should

24

I

25

In terms of the assignment, since it's just been

THE WITNESS:

Within the last month, yes.

MR. NEBEKER:

I think maybe I better have you

168

1 subpoena that, and you can just direct it to Mr. White.
2

MR. OLSEN:

3

MR. NEBEKER: You can send it to me and I will get

4
5

Should we send it to you, Steve, and —j

it to Mr. White.
MS. DALLIMORE:

We can go off the record.

6

(An off the record discussion

7

was held.)

8
9

MR. NEBEKER:

Let the record show I don't have

any questions of Mr. White.

10

(Whereupon, the taking of this

11

deposition was concluded.)

12
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

___^__
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1
2

I

C E R T I F I C A T E

3
STATE Of UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

4
5
6

I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing

7

testimony consisting of

8

J

9

J

to

169

pages, numbered

from

169 inclusive, and the same is a true and

correct transcription of said testimony except as I

10

have corrected it in ink, giving my reasons therefor

11 ]

and affixed my initials thereto

12
13
14

DARCIE H. WHITE

15

* * *

16
17
Subscribed and sworn to at Salt Lake City, Utah,
18
this

day of

198

19
20
21 I

Notary Public

22
23 |
24
25

My Commisiion expires:

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of

D a r c i e H. White

the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken before me,
4

5

I

Rashell

8

1
2
3
4

1
I
)

Utah

testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in said
cause.
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into typewriting,
and that a full, true, and correct transcription of said testimony so
taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from
_3

to 169 , inclusive, and said witness deposed and said as in the

foregoing annexed deposition.

5
S

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

That the said witness was by me, before examination duly sworn to

9
0

, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public

in and for the State of Utah residing at

6
7

Garcia

I further certify that after the said deposition was transcribed
the original of same was delivered to Mr. Nebeker
the

Witness

attorney for

to be by him submitted to the witness for reading

and signature, signed before a Notary Public and to be returned to me
for filing with the Clerk of the said court.

)

I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise associated with)
any of the parties to said cause of action, and that I am not interested
in the event thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
11

day of

April

My commission expires:
December

15, 1984.

1984 .
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ADDENDUM III

M THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRiCT C0UR1
OF UTAH IN ANO FOR EMERY CO.

SEP 21 1934
BRUCE C. FUNK,
Ospu

By.
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
A CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

MEMORANDUM DECISION
RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY
CS NO. 1

On September 12, 1 9 8 4 , a hearing was held in this
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal
tion proceeding.

Investiga-

The Court ruled from the bench on most

Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et s e q . ) , authorizing
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by
other parties on a Motion to reconsider.
The Court previously considered the constitutional
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 3 0 , 1984, and
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the following requirements:
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the
Act must be informed whether or not they are
targets of the investigation;
Recorded in Judgment Record
:

.

*i?w

'- • f

R R i l f T C . FUNK. Cierk

2. Such w i t n e s s e s must be informed of
the nature of the m a t t e r under i n v e s t i g a t i o n
and the scope of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n ;
3, I n v e s t i g a t i o n s c o n d u c t e d under the
authority of the Act must be limited to
criminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n s w i t h i n the p a r a m e t e r s
of the initial good cause a f f i d a v i t .
Since that r u l i n g , the Court has had

opportunity

to see the m a n n e r in which the Act has been applied and is
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the
personal

rights of the citizens of this s t a t e .
For i n s t a n c e , the subpoena duces tecum served

Emery Mining Company

commands

upon

that Company to p r o d u c e :

"records which identify all o f f i c e r s ,
d i r e c t o r s , c o n s u l t a n t s and employees
(both union and n o n - u n i o n , p r o f e s s i o n a l
and m i n i n g ) of Emery Mining for the period
1979 to the p r e s e n t .
Such shall i n c l u d e ,
but not be limited to, names, a d d r e s s e s ,
t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r s , dates of employment
and employee n u m b e r s , if known."
Upon c h a l l e n g e , this Court ordered that general
subpoena s u p p r e s s e d as being too broad in any
of any criminal

investigation

activity.

A previous s u b p o e n a issued by the Attorney
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light

General's

Company's

dealings in uranium m i n i n g , when in fact the original

Good

Cause A f f i d a v i t m e n t i o n e d no indication of any criminal
ings in this area.
c h a l l e n g e d in this

deal-

The State w i t h d r e w this subpoena when
court.
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A n o t h e r s u b p o e n a issued out of this

proceeding

was d i r e c t e d to a CPA firm and o r d e r e d the p r o d u c t i o n

of

the f o l l o w i n g :
"You are c o m m a n d e d to bring with you any and all
b o o k s , r e c o r d s , papers of any kind r e l a t i n g to
Mike T h o m p s o n and A s s o c i a t e s , G u a r d e x , A l a r m e x ,
V a n g u a r d , Mike T h o m p s o n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Mike Z i e m s k i ,
i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Bruce C o n k l i n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Patsy
B o w m a n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; and all o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s
and/or entities associated therewith."
This s u b p o e n a was w i t h d r a w n by the State upon c h a l l e n g e in
this

Court.
The d e p o s i t i o n of L. Brent F l e t c h e r , t a k e n

pursuant

to s u b p o e n a issued under this i n v e s t i g a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g , did
not comply with the r e q u i s i t e s that this Court feels must be
imposed to m a k e the Act c o n s t i t u i o n a l

in its a p p l i c a t i o n in

that the w i t n e s s n e v e r was i n f o r m e d that he was a t a r g e t ,
nor as to the n a t u r e of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and, b e c a u s e of
the Secrecy O r d e r , he had no way of knowing w h e t h e r the m a t t e r
being i n q u i r e d into was w i t h i n the p e r i m e t e r of the good
showing-

He was a l l o w e d , and did h a v e , his a t t o r n e y

cause

present

w i t h him during these p r o c e e d i n g s .
Some criminal c h a r g e s have already been filed in Salt
Lake County based upon i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d through this

proceed-

i n g , and a civil a n t i - t r u s t case has been filed in Salt Lake
C o u n t y , also as a result of some of the i n f o r m a t i o n d e r i v e d
this i n v e s t i g a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g .

from

This i n v e s t i g a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g
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is

still open and being used for w h a t e v e r purposes the State
desires and solely w i t h i n their d i s c r e t i o n under the A c t ,
w i t h o u t limitation as to when a criminal

investigation

becomes a p r o s e c u t i o n or c o n t r o l l i n g the ultimate use of
the findings for civil

purposes.

The Act has been abused and is subject to continued
abuse under its broad terms and p r o v i s i o n s that set no limitations upon the State or any g u i d e l i n e s
subpoena p o w e r .

to the use of their

The Court quite agrees with the Utah

Supreme

Court in its s t a t e m e n t given in the case of In Re The M a t t e r of
Nelda B o y e r , 636 P2d 1 0 8 5 , w h e r e i n the Court states as f o l l o w s :
"When State action impinges on fundamental r i g h t s ,
due process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of p e r m i s s a b l e conduct so as
to avoid u n w a r r a n t e d intrusion on those r i g h t s . "
This Court h a s , t h e r e f o r e , c o n c l u d e d that the Act
is too vague and does not give p r o p e r p r o t e c t i o n
citizens against v i o l a t i o n of their c o n s t i t u i o n a l

to

individual

right of

due process and p r o t e c t i o n against s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n

and

allows for an a b s o l u t e abuse of power w i t h o u t the benefit of
judicial

review or control

once the general s u b p o e n a

is granted and finds the Act is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
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power

THEREFORE* the Court does hereby dismiss this
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court*
DATED this , ^ / ^ d a y

of September, 1984.

1Z. '
BOYD BUNNELL/'DI5TRICT COURT;
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MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM

DECISION RELATIVE TO

C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I T Y , by depositing the same in the United
States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stanley H. Olsen, Esq.
David J. Schwendiman, Esq.
Suzanne M. Dallimore
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Stephen B. Nebeker, Esq.
John A. A d a m s , Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Donald B. Holbrook, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Place
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

John F. Clark, Esq.
SESSIONS & MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Sumner J. Hatch, Esq.
HATCH & McCAUGHEY
72 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110

DATED this ?CYs-

F. Robert Reeder, Esq.
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq.
Michael L. Larsen, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147

day of September, 1984.

Secretary
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF EMERY, STATE OF UTAH
BOYD BUNNELL, Judge

Date

May 30, 1984

John Greenig, Court Reporter

Case No,.

TITLE (Parties Present)

COUNSEL (Counsel Present)

MINUTE ENTRY

Proceedings Before the Court - HEARING
This matter came before the Court on a Hearing. Counsel present for the
Plaintiff was Suzanne Dallimore, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Olsen, and
David Sundeman. Counsel present for the Defendant was Donald Hoi brook, Jeffery
Filburg, Stan Nebeker, and John Adams.
Discussion in this matter concerned three areas, 1) Targets being deposed
need to be told if they are a target in the investigation so that they might
be given time to seek counsel. 2) Targets should be advised of the nature
and scope of which they are chargedc 3) Subpeonas should not request documents
that are not relevate to that particular case.
After much argument by counsel, the Court ruled: 1) Persons must be told
he is target when he becomes such* 2) Target must be told nature and scope
of investigation so that he may claim privileges, 3) Can not request documents
unless it discloses information for that particular case, 4) Information
gathered can not be used for civil discovery.
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ADDENDUM IV

APPENDIX

I

TRANSCRIPTS OF LEGISLATIVE DEBATES,
THIRD READING OF HOUSE BILL 121,
MARCH 10 & 11, 1971
Clerks

An act relating to the subpoena powers in aid

of criminal investigations and prosecutions, authorizing the
Attorney General, District Attorneys, County Attorneys to
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses; providing for
the procedural requisites necessary for securing a subpoena,
the court procedure to be followed in obtaining the testimony
or evidence, and the procedures for securing an order requiring
the person subpoenaed to testify or produce evidence; and
establishing the power of the Attorney General to grant
immunity from prosecution to witnesses in aid of criminal
investigations and prosecutions•

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH:

Section 1;

It is declared, as a matter of legislative

determination that there has been a marked increase in crime
and criminal activity within this state, and that in order to
protect the public health, safety, and morals, it is necessary
to grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal investigations
conducted by the Attorney General, District Attorneys, and
Couaty Attorneys, and to provide a method of keeping

information gained from investigations secret both to protect
the innocent, and to prevent criminal suspects from having
access to information prior to prosecution to the detriment of
the proper enforcement of the criminal laws of this state, and
to clarify the power of the Attorney General, District
Attorneys, and County Attorneys to grant immunity from
prosecution of witnesses whose testimony is essential to the
proper conduct of an investigation of criminal activities and
prosecution of crimes committed within this state • . • •

Mr. Speakers

Representative Fishero

Representative Fisheri

Speaker, I move that we

suspend the rules and discontinue reading the remainder of the
bill and consider it read and ready for consideration of the
committee reporte

Mr* Speakers

It has been moved and seconded that we

dispense with the reading of the rest of the bill*
favor say "Aye".

Responses

Aye

Mr. Speakers

Opposed, "no."

^2-

Those in

(No response)

Mr. Speaker;

The motion is carried and we will ask

the reading clerk to read the committee report•

Clerk:

Mr. Speaker the committee on judiciary

(inaudible) the House (inaudible) House Bill 121 by Mr. Fisher
that all subpoena powers has carefully considered said bill and
reports the same not favorably with the following amendments:
Page 2, delete lines 27, 28 and 29; Page 2, line 31, delete the
words "with the approval of the attorney general".

That's page

2, line 31, delete the words "with the approval of the attorney
general."

Page 3, line 1, after the word "general", add these

words: "district attorney or county attorney."

Page 3, line

29, delete the word "faction" and add the word "act."

Page 3,

line 29, delete the words "the subpoena" and add the words "any
other."
to."

Page 3, line 30, delete the word "of" and add "granted

Page 3, line 30, after the word "and" add "or."

that's "/or"; they have "and/or".
"greeted" under Section 77-45-1.

Well,

Page 3, line 31, delete
Respectfully represented by

Representative Florence, Chairman.

:

Mr. Speaker, I move the adoption of the

committee report.
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Mr. Speaker:
the committee report*

Responses

It is been moved and seconded we adopt
Those in favor say "Aye*81

"Aye*"

Mr« Speaker;

Opposed.

(no response)

Mr. Speakeri

Report is adopted•

Representative

Fisher.

Representative Fishers
members of the House.

Thank you Mr* Speaker and

The purpose of the bill is to permit the

investigation of criminal activities and suspect crimes by
those who are charged with investigation, be it the present
district attorney, the county attorney, or the attorney
general's office by allowing those offices to grant immunity to
those giving testimony and allowing them to subpoena witnesses
and to bring people before them for the purpose of obtaining
information for the filing of criminal complaint.

There are

some subpoena powers at this time available to these people but
they are based upon the filing of complaint and then the
subpoena of witnesses and this action would take place prior to
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the filing of complaints and would not necessarily come about
in the filing of a criminal complaint or culminate in that
activity.

There is one suggested amendment that I think

appropriate and that is on page 2, line 4.

It is suggested

that the subpoena power be limited to approval of the district
court and so on line 4, after the word "right" "have the
right", insert the word "upon application and approval of the
district court for good cause shown."

Rep* Fisher:

It would then read, if I may begin with

section 2, "In any matter involving the investigation of a
crime the existence of a crime or an criminal conspiracy or
activity the attorney general, any district attorney or any
county attorney shall have the right upon application and
approval of the district court for good cause shown to subpoena
witnesses, compel their attendance, etc."

I realize that the

amendment exceeds ten words and I move the waiver or the
suspension of the rules for the submission of that amendment
and the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. Speaker:

It's been moved then that the rules be

suspended and the bill go amended to insert the words "upon
application and approval of the district court for good cause
shown."

Any discussion or plea (interruption by another voice):
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Mr. Speaker, I9m against that amendment.

The purpose

of this is to give the investigative officer the opportunity to
issue a subpoena in order that he might make his investigation
complete*)

I appreciate the fact that there are some who would

like to get the court involved in this thing, but I really feel
that if we elect a county attorney, district attorney and
attorney general who are competent and responsible individuals
they will not abuse this power, but at the same time if it is
going to be necessary for them to go to a court and obtain from
the court permission to do this, to a very large extent this
subpoena filed will be nullified and I think that we ought not
do any more than we now have done with respect to this matter
and I urge that you do not support this amendment.

Mr. Speaker;

Representative Mecham, do you want to

speak on the amendment?

Representative Mechams

No, I8d like to speak on the

bill.

Mr. Speakers

Another Voices

Alright.

Question?

Mr. Speaker;

Question . . • Representative Florence.

Representative Florence;

Amendment, yes.

I've had it

expressed to me by a couple of county attorneys that they are
in favor of this amendment not so much that they are in fear of
abuse by their own office, but it is subject to possible
abuse.

In a sense, it involves a possible dragnet situation if

we allowed complete discretion with the prosecuting attorney to
subpoena any person that he may want even though that
individual would have to be given immunity prior to testifying
to any criminal implication.

It is still something which

delves upon an individual's personal freedom and right to
privacy and there should be some limited area where a person
could, in fact, have this reviewable by a judicial body based
on probable cause so it cannot be a spurious subpoena to
investigate into matters which totally are without the realm of
some criminal activity.

Mr. Speaker;

Representative Cottle.

Representative Cottle;

I would like to concur.

I'm

in favor of this because I could see a possible abuse of this.
In fact I feel that the subpoena law at the present time is
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being abused and so I vote to just say that I would be in favor
of it «

Mr* Speakers

Those in favor of the amendment say

"Aye11.

Responses

"Aye".

Mr > Speaker s Opposed, " N o \

Responses

"No18 •

Mr. Speakers
before us as amended.

The amendment is carried•

The bill is

Representative Fisher•

Representative Fishers

Members of the house I am not

a grammarian, but the amendment * • • (interrupted)

Mr. Speakers

Yes, Representative Buckway.

Representative Buckways

Mr* Speakers

(inaudible)

Yes, that was part of the amendment?

that was part of the motion, I should say, that the* rule has
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been suspended and the amendment be made; so the amendment is
now in the bill.

Continue Representative Fisher.

Representative Fisher:

Thank you.

On page 3, the

committee added the words "and/or" and as I review those two
words in years past in legal language they were used every
other word and every other sentence and they are now more than
archaic; they ought to be dead.

The same with the word "said"

the "said parties or the said contracts".

I think that it is

understood now that when the word "or" is used it applies to
either or all of them together and I think the words "and/or"
have no place in modern grammatic construction.

I may stand

corrected but that's my own feeling about it and I think in
that correction on line 30 of line 3, we ought to strike the
words "and" and the "slash" and leave the word "or" as it's
been inserted.

Mr. Speaker;

The amendment then is to take the

"slash" and the "or" out.

Representative Fisher:

Mr. Speaker:

No, the "slash" and the "and".

The "slash" and the "and"?
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motion?

Representative Fisher:

Yes*

Mr* Speakers

Is there any debate on this

(No response.)

Response;

carried*

Those in favor say "Aye1**

Aye

Mr* Speaker:

bill?

Alright•

Thank you.

Opposed, "No"*

The amendment is

Is there any further debate on this

Representative Mecham?

Representative Mechams

I have some concern about this

bill because I wonder if we8re not really eating away at our
freedoms by going this subpoena power•

I guess the tax

commission of the supreme power; does the governor have
subpoena power? does the auditor? the treasurer?

We ought to

go a little slower with this and I don't say that I disfavor
this bill* but ... seems to me that the more openly we give
this tremendous power of subpoena to these other offices and, I
just wonder if it8s right.

I don't know if it is or if it

isn't, but I think that we ought to make sure that what we do
here is right*

I know that the attorney general and the

district attorney and the county attorney ought to be able to
investigate crime.

They've been doing for it many, many years
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but now we*re going to tighten down a little and put somebody
in jail, I suppose, if he perjures himself through an
examination resulting from the issuance of a subpoena.
don't know.

And, I

I have some hesitations about the whole bill

because I think that maybe we are destroying just a little more
of the right that we have as citizens and I think that somebody
and I would like to be the proponent of this feat along the
realms that I ask so that you see the other side of the
picture.

It just doesn't matter if giving this power away so

lightly and anyway this power of subpoena has a lot of, just
what the word says, it's power because you can be (handed) in;
you can get what the lawyers call a subpoena duces tecum and
they can require you to bring your automobile and all of your
books and records and you can sit there before a court reporter
and be examined and cross-examined and new actions will be
found and I don't know about that.

I would like to have

somebody defend this bill a little more.

It seems to me that,

it appears that I wouldn't want to hamstring law enforcement
because I'm for that too, but on the other hand, when you weigh
these things and the balance, you see there is quite a problem
here and anyone (inaudible) some your rights.

What do you say

about that, Representative Fisher?

Mr. Speaker;

Representative Fisher?...
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Representative Fisher;

Mr. Speaker and members of

House, subpoena powers are used for the purpose of obtaining
evidence and testimony.

I think I can only use the example

that was given to me by the attorney general's office from
where this bill comes.

There is some indication that one of

the small counties in northern, . . . or small cities in
northern Davis County has had some difficulty with the creaming
off of funds from construction contracts.

And they've

endeavored for a number of months to obtain evidence by
testimony concerning that but, without the power to grant
immunity, they've been unable to obtained that evidence*

Also,

without the opportunity to bring testimony prior to the filing
of complaint by subpoena they are unable to obtain that
evidence.

With the subpoena power, they could obtain that

evidence and if it showed what is believed is occurring, then
the action could be brought and a complaint filed.

If it does

not come to fruition, then a lot of embarrassment as to one
public official could be salvaged without going further.

That

was a simple example of part of the reason of this act and I
don8t believe it's an area where abuse will be taken.
Representative Mecham will remember that his Ombudsman Bill was
declared unconstitutional because it gave no protection to the
subpoena power that that committee obtained under the bill that
we passed and, for that reason, the court said it was not a
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constitutional act; at least in this instance.

Now, we have

required that these subpoenas be issued the same as would a
search warrant of a person's home or search warrant of his car
or his person.

Mr, Speaker;

Representative Gar-ine:

Representative Gardner:
Mecham.

I agree with Representative

Possibly this should take a little further study and,

noting the hour, I tnoved that we adjourn until ten o'clock in
the morning.

Response:

(Aye)

Mr. Speaker:
adjourn unti1 10:00 a.m

It's been moved and seconded that we
tomorrow morni ng.

announcements before I place that motion?

Are tl lere any
Representative

Buckway?

Representative Buckway:

Speaker:

Thank you.
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(Inaudible)

Representative Gardner;

Thank you.

State, Federal

and Military Affairs in Room 313 immediately*

Mr. Speaker;

Representative Humphrey.

Representative Humphrey;

Public Safety at five

o'clock in Room 309.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Peterson.

Representative Peterson:

Highways and Aeronautics

will meet immediately after adjournment«

Representative Oberhansen:

Political Subdivisions

will meet at 5:00.

Representative Warren:

Revenue and Taxation will meet

at 5:00 in 303c

Mr. Speaker:

Are there any further announcements?

Those in favor of adjourning until tomorrow morning at 10:00
a.m. say

,8

Aye,B •

Response:

Aye.

-i &~

Opposed/ "No"•

Responses

No*

Motion is carried*
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CONTINUATION OF DEBATE ON H.B. 121, MARCH, 11, 1971

House Bill 121

Mr. Speakers
visit us.

I'm happy to have you students come and

Representatives, at adjournment time yesterday, we

were considering HB 121 and it's now unfinished business and we
will revert to that measure.

This is a measure on which there

was some debate and there were people standing at adjournment
time to debate it further.

The chair recaills that there had

been some amendments proposed and adoptede

Representative

Fisher?

Representative Fisher;

HB-121 is the subpoena powers

granting to the attorney general, the county attorneys and for
two more years, presumably, the district attorneys an
opportunity to obtain evidence by investigation without the
filing of complaint for the determination of whether or not
criminal complaints should be filed.

We inserted an amendment

on page 2 indicating that the subpoena should be issued
pursuant to the authority and approval of the district court
and I think with that amendment, we have a bill that is usable
and of great benefit to law enforcement.

- i fi

Mr* Speaker:

Thank you.

Mr. Speaker:

We111 be in a position here to vote in

just a minute.

[Long pause while inaudible discussion goes on]

Mr. Speaker:

Representatives, for your information,

President Barlow has requested that they be allowed to work on
Senate bills today in view of the fact that the House
apparently has passed more bills now than the Senate has and he
wants time to catch up and since we only have two Senate bills,
I told him that subject to the approval of the House t-hat we
would work on House bills today.

Representative Cottle:

Yes, Representative Cottle?

Is the measurement in that

vein be in order now?

Mr. Speaker:

Cottle:

Yes, it would be,

I make { ne motion then that we work on House

bills today rather than the Senate bills.

Mr. Speaker:

Thank you.

that we work on House bills today.
Those in favor say "Aye."
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It's been moved and seconded
Is there any discussion?

Responses

Aye.

Opposed, "no."

Responses

No*

Mr* Speakers

Motion is carried*

Representative

Warren?

Representative Warreng

Mr* Speaker, members of the

House, we have a lot of very important bills on the calendar
In the interest of time, I'm wondering if a motion wouldn1t be
in order to limit debate to not exceed 30 minutes today*

I so

move*

Mr, Speaker;

It's been moved and seconded that on

measures today that debate be limited to 30 minutes*
any discussion on this proposal?

Representative Redds

Is there

Representative Redd?

I would like to amend that

motion that we limit each participant or speaker to a 2-1/2
minute time limit*

1 ft-

Mr. Speaker:

You would limit 30 minutes per bill but

2-1/2 minutes for each speaker?

Representative Redd,,

Mr* Speakers

Right• .

Is there any debate on that amendment?

Representative Carling.

Representative Carling,;;

I think that in some cases,

if you've got an important bill and it's going to take some
explanation, such 2-1/2 minutes might be too short.
the 1/2 hour limit is probably a good limit*

I think

And let that be

divided as the speaker would see fit between the two parties,
the two sides, if Hiere is two sides.
up there and I don't intend to talk.

Mr. Speaker:

'\n<! I haven't got a bill
(Ha. Ha. Ha.)

Representative Woodmurphy.

Representative Woodmurphy:

I think we're kind of

categorizing all these bills, aren't we?

We're all saying that

they are all going to be equally important or equally
unimportant«

However, you will

. there may be some bills

to which we should give further attention.
we should give l«vs,

And some to which

Might we consider a degree of flexibility
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here?

In our last session, we had motion "A" as I recall.

I

don't know quite how to delineate this situation here, . . •

Mr. Speaker;

Well, I could observe this that in the

event that an important bill came up and the House decided that
more than 30 minutes was necessary, I could always at the end
of 30 minutes vote to continue the debate.

Representative Woodmurphys

Hro Speakers

Okay, thank you.

It8s been moved and seconded then that

debate be limited to 30 minutes on each bill and that no
speaker take longer than 2-1/2 minutes and I would assume that
this would mean the sponsor, however, could have 2-1/2 minutes
at the start and 2-1/2 minutes at the end.
the motion . • ••

Representative Starr, did you want to speak?

Representative Starrs

Mr. Speakers

Responses

Those in favor of

No.

Those in favor say "Aye.18

"Aye."

Opposed, "No."

on~

Response:

"No•"

Mr. Speakers
Representatives

The motion is carried*

Now

>^ 5re in a position to vote on HB-121 and

voting is open and will each member record his vote.

Mr* Speaker;

Stevens have you voted?

Rep. Anderson is absent.

[PAUSE]

Thank you.

Rep. Atkin, Gardner, Sowards, Rep.

Mathisen, Rep• Nol der; Okay, al 1 right, etc.

Rep. Hansen,

Clark.

Mr. Speaker;
present has voted.

It appears to the Speaker that everyone

The voting will be closed and HB-121 is

passed by a vote of 42 to 17 and will be 1: eferred to the Senate
for its further action.

Representative Dimitrich?

0329h
EMH/DW
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APPENDIX III
Transcripts of Legislative Debates, House Bill Number 32,
January 19, 20, and February 1, 1980, State of Utah

House Debate on House Bill Number 32, January 1980

Speaker;

Response?

All in favor say Aye

Aye•

Speakers

Those opposed say no*

Speakers

Motion carries * Go ahead•

Representatives

(No response)

Thank you Mr* Speaker.

Ladies and

gentlemen of the house • c »

Representative s Just a minute, that has not been read
in.

Read it in please.

Representatives

House Bill No. 32 Utah Code of

Criminal Procedure by Representative Roger A. Livingston.
it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah • . •

Be

Speaker;

Representative Livingston.

Representative Livingston;

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

Ladies and gentlemen, i f I could introduce House Bill 32 to you
by relaying as accurate as I can a telephone conversation I had
this morning.

The Chief of Police of Provo City, whom I had

never met before, called and asked for the status of House Bill
32 and literally pleaded with me for the sake of his local law
enforcement that House Bi] 1 3 2 "be passed and hi s comment is not
far different from those that I've related to you before from
county attorneys, from judges and others throughout t: he state
who have said, "the Bill's not perfect, it's not the way that I
would write it if I had the total authorship but the need to
have this occur is so great :±n«i we are so hamstrung right now
with the confusion regarding the rules of the game, the rules
of procedure tha^ •-<. '•.;:><-..-; ••--•••-; Hill passed."1

As he expressed

to me a great deal of frustration as others have who work in
this area why it has taken so many years and years and years to
have this ..*-modification take place.

House Bill 32 is a

lengthy bill and I apologize to you for the length of that
particularly in trie 'r idget session.
have before you.

It's a cumbersome thing to

Let me point out that a third of what is

before you is already in the Utah Code.
and reenacting it.

It's simply reputing

Why are we reputing it?
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Well to put it in

proper sequence, to have it sequestially work hand in hand with
the substantive criminal code that Representative White earlier
alluded to*

Some six or seven years ago this completely

repealed and reenacted a new penal code that defined what the
crimes are in the State of Utah*

At that time there should

have been a new Code of Criminal Procedure enacted that would
tfork hand and glove with that as the old procedure worked hand
in hand with the old law and that's never taken place.

The net

cesult that there is a tremendous amount of ambiguity, of
confusion, of difficulty in administering the entire criminal
and penal process.

I mentioned that a third of this bill is

simply reenactment of the prior law.

Additionally, a

substantial portion of this is placing into the Code what is
low the law relating to procedure as a result of both Utah
Supreme Court case and the United States Supreme Court case law
and those are already the law of the State of Utah but because
It's not set forth clearly and succinctly and in a proper
sequence it makes it very very confusing for people who work in
this area.

So House Bill 32 is the result of a Herculean

effort over many years by many people in trving to pull
together a desperately needed task and that is the entire
decompilation or remodification of all the rules of criminal
procedurec

Because of the length of the bill and the

Logistical problems of having them prepared and typed and the

versions of them, there were some amendments made last year by
this body to this bill as well as amendments made by the
Interim Committee which were not included in the bill as it was
presented and introduced into this body and accordingly there
were amendments made by the Standing Committee and those
amendments appear in the pink sheets in your book.
Additionally, Mr. Speaker, I do have a page and a half of
amendments that I would like to move at this time.

i believe

they've all •' * . they've been passed out to all of the
Representatives.

It's on a page and a half of loose sheets.

If any of you don't have this, would you raise your hand and
I'll make sure a messenger brings one to you.

Mr. Speaker,

would I be in order to move all of the amendments it one time?
I have . • . if It would be in order, I'd like to just refer to
these amendments and then move them in one motion.

Speakers

All right, go ahead.

Representative Livingston:

The first amendment refer

to • * • add some language that this body overwhelmingly
suggested on a separate bi 11 sponsored by Representative
Selleneit which requires a defendant upon certain conditions to
pay part of the cost of a criminal defense.
amendment regarding page 44, line 12.
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And this is •--•?*

The next section

provides some protection to a defendant regarding night search
warrants and this is kind of a controversial thing and that,
generally, prosecutors don't want it, defense attorneys do want
it.

Those that do want the amendments and this motion is made

and these amendments are submitted in the spirit of compromise
and, being conciliatory, I think it's the feeling of the county
attorneys that the need for the bill is so* great that they
would rather include this and make it a little more defense
oriented for the . • • just so that we can get the bill passed
at this time.

The final amendment on the first page regards

protection to newspaper, news media and others who have
expressed some concern about the ability of law enforcement
people to search newsrooms and other areas that have
constitutionally protected rights and, so, that amendment
requires that if a subpoena would obtain the information, then
a search warrant would not be issued and it provides the
specific protection for news sources and confidentially
protected relationships like that and I believe this is the
amendment that Representative Fox inquired about earlier.
There is a deletion of the no-knock provision on page 66, line
13 and then the final amendment is to administrative search
warrant provision and this is one that Representative Selleneit
called to our attention and it places the requirement for
probable cause that a crime has been committed before an
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administrative search warrant could issue•

Without that

amendment, there is some fear of OSHA nr some other
administrative agency perhaps overstepping their bounds with
respect to search warrants.

So these amendments that tfm

moving at this time, I hope would alleviate any of the prior
controversy which you may have heard concerning these bills.
It's a good faith effort by the county attorneys, associations
and others to make this bill as acceptable to as many groups as
possible and I would move all of these "intendment s * -. i qiuup,
Mr. Speaker.

Speaker ? Would someone • * * We need those amendments
in the circle.

It1 very important we have them and correctly

stated or it won't get into the journal that wa ' "iii«{ vnt're in
trouble.

Does everyone have those amendments?

white sheet.
that.

They're on a

They should be on a pink sheet but we'll overlook

Now to the Livingston amendments.

I see no lights on

Representative Livingston, we'll call for the question on your
amendments.

All in favor say Aye.

Response:

Speaker:

Aye.

Those opposed say no«
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(No response)

Speaker:
To the bill.

Motion carried.

Now the bill as amended*

Representative Fox.

Representative Foxs

I'm a bit concerned about the

size of this bill that we have before us in this very busy
budget session.

It's 161 pages long.

There are some very

subtle but very significant changes that are being made in our
criminal code.

I'm concerned that we, as busy legislators,

haven't had the time to read all 161 pages and understand the
changes.

I'm still trying to find out what all of the

amendments did to the present bill before us.

If you've read

the Salt Lake City Tribune for Monday and Tuesday, you811
notice that they editorialized both days against this bill and
I think that they did that for substantive reasons.

I think

there's no question that we need a revision in our criminal
code, but I believe that that revision should be done at a time
when we as legislators have enough time to be able to take a
solid look at what these changes are going to meane

Criminal

Code revisions should be put over until the next regular
session.

If we act too hastily, we're going to be impacting

the state for years to come until these changes are finally
worked out.
this.

I think there's no real great rush to move into

The Salt Lake Tribune talked about two aspects, one was

use immunity and the other was the search warrants.
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They

pointed out that they believed that these provisions did not
need to be changed,

I'm not sure what those amendments did and

I believe that most of the legislatures in here don't know what
those amendments did,

I think we ve got plenty of time to talk

about this bill and I think we should continue it in the next
session.

I would urge you to vote against it.

Speaker;

Thank you.

Representative Selleneit.

Representative Selleneit:
support the bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to

1 had many concerns on the bill too md hav^

spent a great deal of time and I would say that 95% of my
concerns have been addressed in the amendments as made.

1

think it is needed and I would encourage your support.

Speakers

Thank you.

Representative Livingston,

seeing no further lights, do you want to quickly sum it?

Representative Livingston:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Again, Representatives, this is a bill that represents a
monumental task in bringing it to you.

T 'issute you that if I

had the total prerogative of authorship, there would be
amendments that I would want and I am sure that there are many
who would have that.

But we need the remodification that needs
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to be done at this time and in subsequent sessions there could
be fine tuning to it? but, as county attorneys and police
officials and others throughout the entire state, both
prosecution and defense attorneys, saying we need this, this
has to be done and I urge your favorable support*

Speakers

Thank you.

Thank you*

Voting is now open*

chair that all present have voted*

There is a

Voting will now be closed.

HB 32 as amended has received 47 affirmative votes, 22 negative
votes.

Pass this house and will be sent to the Senate for

their further consideration*

Representative Bishop.

House Debate of H.B. 32, February 1, 1984
(after Senate Consideration)

Speaker;

Utah Code of Criminal Procedure by

Representative Roger A. Livingston.

The bill is returned here

for further house action. Respectfully, Sophia C. Buckmiller,
secretary to the Senate.

Speakers

Senate Bill 43 will be signed as 15.

that the next one you read?

Representative Livingston.

«.g^

32, is

Representative Livingston;

Mr. Speaker, 1 would

(inaudible) that we concur with the Senate amendments regarding
House Bill 32.

Speaker:

You've heard the motion that we concur with

the Senate amendments on • . • Bill 32 . . .

Representative:

Does that require a roll call vote

Mr. Speaker?

Speaker:
First we*11 take
the roll call.

. . .

les

that requires a roll call vote.

your motion to place it and then we'll go to

All in favor say Aye.

Response:

Aye.

Speaker:

Those opposed say no.

Speaker:

Motion carried

again on that bill.
voted on this.

(No response)

We111 now have to vote

Let's quickly vote.

All present have

Voting will now be clob^l . House Bi I ( 32

received b4 itfirmative, zero negative votes.
House.
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Passed this

Senate Debate on House Bill 32, January 1980

Presidentt

House Bill 32, Utah Code of Criminal

Procedure by Representative Roger A. Livingston,

This is a

long title so . * «

Senators

Mr. President, I move that under suspension

of the rules we suspend reading of the entire title on this
bill.

Presidents

All in favor of suspending the rules in

reading this short title say Aye*

Responses

Aye•

Presidents

Opposed•

(No response)

So be it.

Presidents

The Senators I'm sure will remember that

the long length of time that we spent last session on these two
bills.

They are the same bills, House Bill 32 and House Bill

31, are the same bills that we started in the Senate last
time*

You811 recall that we passed them here in this body and

they they died in the final crunch over in the House, partly
because they were late getting in.
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They're such big bills that

it took our legal services a long time to finish the drafting
of it, but partly because a few people over in the House had
some questions about parts of it.
year of study.

And so its now had another

Let me just fill in the background.

You'll

recall that in 1963 the Legislature, through their interim
committees process organized an interim study with regard to
our Criminal Code which ultimately resulted in, eight years
later, in 1973, in a complete revision of the Criminal Code of
the State of Utah.

It was a massive project.

Simultaneously,

and in relation to that, there was also a review by Interim
Committee of the Criminal Procedures Code.

Part of the problem

was that our Criminal Procedure Laws for the State of Utah
essentially all of them dated back to the original statehood in
1898.

Those procedures had been here and there through

patchwork legislation modified over the year but, substantially
have remained the same.

We've updated and modernized our

Criminal Code but, we need to modernize and conform to that
Criminal Code, our Criminal Procedures Code and also the rules
that the Court use in applying the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Now, further, I'll refresh your memory that the study on these
particular code amendments began as an interim study group nine
years ago under Judge Croft and members of our interim
legislative study who spent four years redrafting all of our
Cod3 of Criminal Procedures.

After that was done a follow up
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committee was organized under the direction of Judge Crockett
in the Supreme Court who then took work and went back paragraph
by paragraph and sentence by sentence reviewing, revising,
modifying and updating it*

That group spent four years on it*

I was a member of that committee and so were another
legislature and they had sessions in the areas of criminal
defense and criminal prosecution working on that.
of that, the bill was brought in last session.

As a result

We made some

amendments and there are some that will need to be put in here
from the floor to conform with the same bill that we has last
session, but, essentially what I'm saying is we've had nine
years of (inaudible) a detailed study of this criminal
procedure code by experts and by members of the legislature to
come in with recommendations.

It has to do with many areas of

the code which is used by the courts to determine or to confirm
procedures in criminal prosecutionsc
thingo

It is a very broad

Its many pages long, I have sent out to the desks of

the Senators about a twenty page summary earlier today so we
would have an opportunity to refresh your memories on it and
essentially what it does is«

Bring current and update our

statutes of criminal procedure, it repeals all of the existing
procedural law and replaces them with this broad and extensive
change much of which, by the way, merely ceenacts Code sections
the way they presently are but in those areas where we needed
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to conform it to the criminal code or to update it, it makes
the changes.

So, I would be glad to respond to questions if

there are questions but essentially its the same bill that we
passed last session.

Senator Asay;

President;

Mr. President.

Senator Asay.

Senator Asay:

As a member of the Joint Judiciary

Committee, we studied this for some months last, during the
interim, and I tried to make a real conscientious study of the
bill because of its great length and complexity, I've just
. . . didn't have the understanding to (inaudible) and, so, I
called those who would know more about it.

Both legal and in

the legal profession and otherwise and I feel good about the
bill.

I recognize that it isn't perfect and I see the House

has done some (inaudible) on it

work done on it but

I can vote yes on this bill as well as the Code of Criminal
Procedure.

Presidents

That's good.
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Next Mr.

•

Senators

Mr. President, I too was a member of that

committee and heard the testimony and some of the concerns that
were voiced.

Senator Jackson indicated that it has been a

total of nine years being studied by experts, studying all
these nine years to refine it and bring it to its current
(inaudible) and yet the House needed to amend it and I
understand there are other amendments being proposed.

I'm

concerned (about) the length of this bill, the complexity of
it.

We have ought not to be considering it in this budget

session when we have such limited time*

If its been the nine

years in the process, one more year will not make or break it;
so, I fail to see the urgency of this and maybe Senator Jeffs
can point out some emergencies I'm not aware of.

Presidents

Senator Jeffs.

Senator Jeffss

I think I can.

your philosophy as to what's needed.

I guess it depends on

I personally feel that we

need more strength in the unit of our criminal prosecution
system and its urgent that we tighten it down.

In many areas,

that's precisely what this does and while we go on having
prosecutions that are ineffectual because our statute's unclear
and having perhaps defense counsel getting defendants free on
technicalities, the purpose of this is to tighten it down so we
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don't have so many problems with technical errors in criminal
prosecution.

I think thats urgent.

President:

Senator:

Are there further questions?

Senator Farley, I think has some . . .

President:

Senator Farley.

Senator Farley:

I expect to get this vote now.

President, I have an amendment.

Mr.

I'm beginning to feel like a

broken record on this amendment.

Both of you who were here in

1977 will remember that we successfully amended this criminal
code revision the same way that we also successfully amended it
last year and here we are again.

What we're doing is really

not an amendment, it is (inaudible) the immunities (inaudible)
as our (inaudible) rather than replacing it with use immunity.
For those of you who are not familiar with what it is, I've had
passed out an editorial from the Tribune, Tuesday morning's
Tribune of this week which explains relatively (inaudible)
immunity so what I would like to ask you, and by the way I'm
submitting this amendment which you have on a buff sheet with
the concurrence of the author of the bill, concurrence of Roger
Livingston, Representative Roger Livingston, to this amendment
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and I would like now t ask you if you would consider on page 62
(inaudible) that you find on the buff sheet.

I think it

probably shouldn't be necessary for me to read this entire
sheet since this is the same amendment that you approved last
year and the same amendment that you approved three years ago,
Four years ago, '77, f79 and '80.

Senator Jeffss

Presidents

Mr. President.

Senator Jeffs*

Senator Jeffss

Responding to that, let me just

comment that what this amendment would do would be to make a
new law essentially the same as the present law and the new
code section didn't have a recommendation for a modification.
I agreed with Senator Farley last time that it should be
amended this way if we want to make a determination at a later
date as to whether or not use immunity should or should not be
granted in Utah, I think that should not be done in this bill
and so I support her amendment.

Presidents

Thank you Senator Jeffs.
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President:
further discussion?

You've heard the motion to amend is there
(Inaudible) called for on Senator Farley's

amendment on the buff sheet.

Any discussion?

All in favor of

the amendment say Aye.

Responses

Aye.

President;

Opposed.

(No response)

The motion

carries.

Senator;
page 12

I have a question, Senator Jeffs.

On

where they're talking about impeachment proceedings,

it looks like the House amended that.

Do you know what the

logic is there?

Senator Jeffs;

There's something about (inaudible) of

the House or apparently prosecute the proceedings before this
body I don't feel that it hurts or helps, I just . . .

Senator:

No, I have not received a copy of it, but, I

listened to Representative Livingston, the chief sponsor, he
said it was some of them over there preferred this different
language and he saw no objection to it.

.1 Q „

Senator:

I don't either but I was curious as to the

logic of it.

Senator Jeffs;

Presidents

Mr* President*

Senator Jeffs.

Senator Jeffs;

Yes, our State Highway Patrol has

contacted me in connection with an amendment that apparently
has been left out in terms of a typo and I've had that passed
out.

Also, Senator Snow has an amendment that if somebody can

bring him in, I think he wants to make«

While he's coming, let

me explain to you the nature of this amendment.
handed out to you and it is on page 25.

It's been

Having to do with the

fresh pursuit and the basic problem is that in the typing of
the buff sheet, we gave the right to out of state police
officers to come racing into Utah under fresh pursuit, but, we
left out the language that allows our own officers to do it and
you can imagine that our officers were a little concerned with
that, so, that I offer this amendment on page 25, line 31 after
the words "proceedings", add the new section 77-9-3 to put back
into this code, the right that they presently have to not
pursue«
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President:

You've heard the motion by Senator Jeffs.

Hot isn't it?

Senator:

Ye s.

President:

All in favor of Senator Jeffs' amendment

to House Bill 32 on page 25, line 31.

All in favor of that

amendment say Aye.

Response:

Aye.

President:

Opposed no.

President:

Now, Senator Snow.

Senator Snow:
short page.

(No response)

Motion carried.

Let me direct your attention to the

I would propose on page 3, line 6 after the work

"power" delete the lines "nullify the Commissioner of Public
Safety as to such establishment" and in lieu thereof, insert
the words "make application to the Commissioner of Public
Safety and be certified by the Commissioner as (inaudible) the
rules to regulations promulgated by the Department of Public
Safety."
here.

Now let me indicate to you what we're dealing with

We're looking at the category 1, police officer status
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and where the same is given to institution of higher education
and there appears to be considerable concern about that
actiono

I think most of it is not well understood, however*

But in order to satisfy some of those concerns for what may be
intemperate action or ill-prepared security services, we would
reverse the situation here, rather than simply having them
notify the Commissioner that they have established such
security service that they seek permission and qualify for that
status through the Commissioner of Public Safety.

It would

again require, of course, the Commissioner of Public Safety to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for making that
determination*

Presidents

Senators

Are there questions to Senator Snow?

Mrc President, I might just comment that the

Governor ask us to add this additional language on that section*

Presidents

Any further discussion?

Now call for the

motion to vote on Senator Snow's amendment on page 3, line 3*
All those for his amendment say Aye.

Response;

Aye.
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President;

Opposed.

(No response)

No.

Motion

carries.

Senator;

He's always out of order.

President;

(Laughter)

Senator Snow, do you have another one.

Senator Snow;

Yes, let me address all of them

together and indicate to you what the purpose of these
amendments are.

It so happens that there was a Senate Bill

that sought to accomplish essentially the same thing here.
Senate Bill 37, which I ask to be tabled in committee because
of this provision here in HB 32, which was covering the same
section.

Currently now, there are commitments made to the Utah

State Hospital and the charges for that commitment under the
present law are to born by the several counties.

It seems that

once those commitments are made that there is little interest
on the part of the court for lifting that commitment even
though the individual has completed the diagnosis or indeed the
treatment and this remains to be a cost to be born by the
hospital and, so, these amendments that you find on the buff
colored page are intended to correct that problem and they're
aimed at reducing the budgetary burdens that are placed upon
the state hospital because of that and providing the procedure
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whereby the hospital could return to the court and notify the
court of the fashion of completion of its evaluation*
Essentially, that what is accomplished here by the several
amendments*

Senator Renstrom;

President;

Senator Renstrom.

Senator Renstroms
Snow.

Mr* President.

I'm just a little confused Senator

Are we talking about people here that have been

committed by the court as a result of mental hearings as well
as people that have been committed to the court who we've found
not guilty by virtue of insanity?

Senator Snows

We're talking about individuals who

have appeared before the court and, before the court does
anything, they've remanded them, if you will, whatever term is
appropriate for evaluation, to the Utah State Hospitalc

Senator Renstrom;

Well, if I understand what your

trying to do, it would reduce the budget of the State Hospital
but increase the budget of the counties.
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Senator Snow:

But, the law now really says that the

county must assume that burden and that's clear under the
statutes.

I might indicate, however, that some counties

unilaterally have decided that they don't want to do that but
that is the law and I can cite that to you quite quickly*

Senator Renstrom:

I guess I'm still trying to find

our what the gist of your amendment is.

If its going to reduce

the budget of at the Utah Hospital?

Senator Snow:

It will reduce the budget.

Its going

to reduce, I think, strains on the hospital because they're not
now getting the dedicated credit that they ought to be
collecting from the counties as required by the law because
there seems to be some ambiguity
commitments, I think that's

but, secondly, once

those

the proper term to use, but be

patient with me if it isn't, to the hospital, if you're sent
there for thirty days and hospital can do nothing about it
until the Judge lifts the order, even after thirty days and
we're trying to avoid that so that the Director of the hospital
can go back to the court and notify the court and . . .

Senator Renstrom:

That's always the truth.

94-

Senator Snows

That's correct.

Senator Renstromg

President;

All right*

Further questions on Senator Snow's

amendment?

Senator;

I would move the adoption of the amendments

on the buff colored sheet 9

Presidents

To the Motion of Senator Snow6s , 1-5,

page 35 and anything on page 40*

All in favor of his amendment

say Aye*

Response;

Presidents
carries.

Aye.

Opposed no«

(No response)

Motion

Do we have other amendments?

Senator;

If there are no further questions or

discussions, Mr. President, I believe question on the bill.
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